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Abstract
This paper measures the effect of political integration, such as sharing a national state
or economic union, on the degree of trade integration. Consistently with previous work,
we find large border effects. However, such estimates may be biased and overestimate the
effects of borders because of endogeneity: selection into sharing a political space is correlated
with affinities for trade. We propose a method to address this and we produce estimates
which are closer to the causal effect. We then conduct speculative exercises showing the
costs and benefits of the changing levels of integration associated with: the independence of
Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country from the UK and Spain (but remaining within
the European Union); the UK’s exit from the EU; the break-up of the EU itself; and closer
integration within the EU so that its internal borders appear similar to the internal borders
of individual countries (as opposed to its current state of being simply a closely integrated
group of countries). We find that the border effect between countries is an order of magnitude
larger than the border effect associated with the European Union.
Key words: Border effect, trade, independence. JEL Classification: F15, R13
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to measure the effect of political integration, such as sharing a national
state or economic union, on the degree of trade integration, and to quantify its welfare implications.
We define the economic integration as the causal effect of sharing political space upon welfare - this
is the additional welfare gained by entities which come together to form a country or an economic
union, due to increased trade.
We calibrate a structural trade model to interregional and international trade data, and obtain
the implicit trade frictions that would explain the observed data, something often referred to as
the Head Ries Index (HRI)1. We do this while treating countries and sub-national units for which
we have data, as entities with the same status within a common framework. We define the average
border effect as the average difference between the interregional and the international frictions,
controlling for physical distance, common language, and size. Likewise the average effect of the
European Union is the average difference between frictions within and across the EU boundary,
controlling for those same characteristics. The existence of very large border effects, even within
the European Union, is well known2 and in this paper we also find large average border effects.
Our main point though is that these average border effects are bound to overestimate the gains
from sharing a state. This is because places which share larger affinities are more likely to both
trade with each other and to select into sharing a political space (a country, or EU membership).
Due to this endogeneity the average effect likely overstates the reductions in trade frictions achieved
by sharing a political space.
For instance, the fact that Scotland and England share a country is related to the fact that
they trade a lot - but we cannot claim that the high volume of trade is all caused by the fact of
1According to Head and Mayer (2014), Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2016) coin the label “Head-Ries
Index” since this “indicator first appears in Head and Ries (2001)”.
2Many papers in the economics of international trade literature have looked at the border effect, starting with
the seminal contribution of McCallum (1995). This empirical work was embedded into the modern trade theory
literature by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who found a substantial border effect that differentiated trade
between U.S. states and Canadian provinces. The theory consistent econometric estimation approach of Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) is what is typically used in this literature, for example Coughlin and Novy (2013) compare
the magnitude on the coefficients of U.S. state-international borders and state-state borders and conclude that
the incremental friction increase is greater when comparing state-state trade to intra-state trade, than it is for
state-international trade to state-state trade. Our results for the average differences between interregional and
international borders are consistent with the estimates from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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state sharing. Scotland and England would trade at a relatively high rate even if they did not
share a country. The affinities that lead to trade between the two also increase the likelihood of
nation state sharing. The causal effect of nation state sharing can be quantified by only changing
the status of state sharing or not - not by also changing these affinities. Looking at the average
difference in trade within and across national borders, even when controlling for physical distance
and common language, does not compare like with like in terms of these affinities. The average
friction between the UK with the rest of the countries of the world, after controlling for physical
distance, size and language, is much larger than the frictions that plausibly would exist between
Scotland and England in the case of independence, even if in that case the frictions were larger
than the ones that we observe today. We would overstate the costs of political separation if we
were to augment the current Scotland-England frictions with the average border effect.
Our approach to deal with this endogeneity problem has a certain resemblance (at least in
spirit) to regression discontinuity analysis (see Imbens and Lemieux (2008)) or synthetic control
methods (see Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010))3. We identify “marginal regions”, defined
as regions or countries whose leadership seeks to exit the political space under consideration (e.g.
Scotland seeking independence from the UK). We also identify “marginal countries”, based on the
countries with the smallest frictions with the country to which the “marginal region” currently
belongs (e.g. Ireland is the natural counterfactual to Scotland with respect to the UK). Essentially
“marginal regions” are regions of a larger country that could conceivably be independent, and
“marginal countries” are independent countries that could easily be regions of the larger country.
This comparison should be clean of the endogeneity problem insofar as the ex-ante probabilities
for the “marginal country” and the “marginal region” to form a political union to the country to
which the “marginal region” belongs, are similar. And insofar as this comparison is clean of the
endogeneity problem, it should give us estimates which are closer to the causal impact of sharing
political space. Conducting counterfactual exercises based on the difference in frictions between
3Regression discontinuity and synthetic control methods exploit the existence of pre and post treatment periods
in the data, with a control that matches the treated population in the pre-treatment period. The observed difference
between treated and untreated control in the post-treatment period can then be interpreted as the causal impact
of the treatment. In our case, the treatment is political integration, and seek to identify “treated” and “untreated”
entities which are as close to being marginal cases as possible. Our methods for doing this are necessarily somewhat
arbitrary, but are nevertheless interesting, produce results which confirm the intuition of an issue with endogeneity,
and may yield some general insights.
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“marginal region” and “marginal country” allows us to quantify welfare implications.
For example we estimate the value of Scotland’s economic integration within the UK by com-
paring welfare values calculated using the measured Scotland-rest of the UK friction, and the
measured Ireland-UK friction (because Ireland is observed to have the lowest measured frictions
with the UK). In addition to having the lowest measured friction with the UK, Ireland is similar
in size to Scotland, shares a common language with Scotland and the rest of the UK, is contiguous
with the UK (via Northern Ireland), and shares much common history (including formerly being
part of the UK) - and so we observe that our methodology produces appropriate and interesting
counterfactuals.
An issue that could be potentially damaging for our approach to measuring the welfare change
induced by political integration, is the possibility that the degree of political integration between
two entities A and B may affect the economic frictions between each of them and a third party C.
For instance, we will argue that loosening political integration between two entities (for instance,
Scotland becoming independent from the UK) will increase the frictions between Scotland and the
rest of the UK, but it is in principle possible that independence could also change the frictions
between Scotland and the rest of the world (presumably decreasing them). If that were the case,
our approach would overstate the welfare gains of political integration. We show though, that
this does not seem to be the case. Marginal regions in our analysis have frictions with the rest of
the world are in line with those of similarly sized independent countries. In this sense, economic
integration is a gain: it does not appear to be achieved at the expense of higher frictions with the
rest of the world.
We conduct speculative exercises to illustrate the quantitative importance of economic integra-
tion. We consider the independence scenarios for Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country,
as well as looking at “Brexit”: the exit of the UK from the European Union. Furthermore we
look at combinations of these such as Scotland staying in the EU by becoming independent as the
rest of the UK undergoes Brexit. Finally, we consider scenarios which look at the disintegration
of the EU, as well as the possibility that the EU furthers its degree of economic integration across
countries to the same level that there is within its member states.
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Welfare impacts can easily be quantified following the contribution of Arkolakis, Costinot, and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) who show that the welfare impact of a given change in trade flows, subject
to parameters, are the same in all trade models within the class of ‘gravity models’, and given
by a simple formula4. The productivity or welfare implications of changes in trade frictions can
be examined using policy experiments, and this has been done in many papers in the literature5.
In this paper we evaluate the welfare impacts of changing frictions by the magnitude measured
between our marginal regions and marginal countries as an estimate towards what may be the
causal impact of state-sharing. Although we have only a few cases to consider in our data, and the
welfare impacts are different in each case, we do observe a pattern that suggests we may be able to
make a general claim. In all the examples that we look at, and independently of parameters, the
welfare cost of losing the economic integration a region has with the rest of its country, relative to
the welfare cost of autarky, is between one third and one half, i.e. economic integration within a
larger country seems to account for between one third and one half of the total gains from trade
relative to autarky for regions of the size of Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country.
We show that the average econometric estimation exercise (not taking into account the endo-
geneity) over-estimates the causal effect of sharing a country upon economic integration. Neverthe-
less, the value of such economic integration once controlling for this endogeneity is still substantial.
Belonging or not to the EU also has quantitatively significant welfare effects, but these are observed
to be almost an order of magnitude less significant than the impact of sharing a country.
We do not explain the institutional arrangements or mechanisms that lead to economic integra-
tion within countries, we simply identify the size of this integration, and quantify its importance
4Though particular microfoundations are suggestive of particular values for the parameters and so do matter, a
point made by Melitz and Redding (2015). The microfoundations can be very different, e.g.: a love of variety means
that the available product range expands with the size of the market and leads to aggregate increasing returns to
scale, as in Krugman (1980); a larger market can lead to better firm selection as efficient firms expand to serve this
larger market, putting upward pressure on wages, and lowering profitability of low productivity firms who exit, as
in Melitz (2003); and traditional Ricardian trade explanations as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). All imply different
structural interpretations, and hence different parameter values. Further, the simple formula is different for different
sub-classes of gravity models: in this paper we use a gravity model with tradable intermediate goods as discussed
in Section IV of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012).
5Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2014) is a review of this literature. Examples of papers within this literature
are Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (examines the impact of a drop in all frictions of 5% in a calibrated
model); and Corcos, Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2012) (examines a number of policy experiments including
undoing non-tariff barrier liberalisations associated with EU membership, implementing 5% tariff barriers on trade
with the world outside EU, and implementing 5% tariffs on all international trade). Head and Mayer (2014) provide
a toolkit for implementing such policy experiments in general equilibrium.
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(a) Trade:GDP ratio of EU countries, plus Scotland,
Catalonia & Basque Country
(b) Herfindahl Index of Trade Concentration of EU
countries, plus Scotland, Catalonia & Basque Coun-
try
Figure 1: Trade and trade concentration in regions and countries
within a modern general equilibrium model of trade. The differences in the degree of economic
integration may be due to many reasons: biases in government procurement6, home bias in pref-
erences, regulation favouring local firms, political economy biases, migratory patterns, network
formation, etc. In this paper we simply point to the facts and leave the investigation of potential
causes to further research7.
* * * * *
We begin our analysis with an illustration showing that something happens within countries
that is different from what happens across countries: the patterns of trade for regions that very
plausibly could be independent countries are very different from those of independent countries.
These regions exhibit a very high degree of trade concentration that marks them out as very
different from otherwise similar countries within the EU. If we treat Scotland, Catalonia, and
the Basque Country as if they were independent countries and compare their trade patterns with
those of the other EU members, we see immediately that the most remarkable difference between
these regions and the other countries is not how much they trade, but rather how much they
6In a recent paper, Herz and Varela-Irimia (2016) using the universe of public procurement contracts within the
EU show that the nationality of the winner of the contract (the supplier) is its most salient characteristic. The
border effect in public procurement within the EU is enormous, in spite of being explicitly prohibited by the Union
treaties to discriminate in favor of domestic suppliers.
7A recent literature on internal frictions is also helpful in moving forward this research agenda, for example Atkin
and Donaldson (2015), Cosar, Grieco, and Tintelnot (2015), and Ramondo, Rodr´ıguez-Clare, and Sabor´ıo-Rodr´ıguez
(2016).
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concentrate their trade with a single partner: the rest of the country to which they belong. Figure
1a8 shows that the trade share of these regions is typical in a European context, but Figure 1b
highlights how anomalous these regions’ trade concentrations are compared with EU countries. It
shows the Herfindahl index of trade concentration9, and it shows the regional Herfindahl Indices
as much higher than that of even the most trade concentrated independent EU members10: it’s
almost an order of magnitude type comparison. Our exercise will consist of building reasonable
counterfactuals for these regions where they appear as normal countries.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the Head Ries Index framework
for measuring trade frictions, present our cross country and region comparison results (including
some interesting results on the differences in the degree of home bias between trade in goods and
trade in services), and show the (unsurprising) result that a large border effect exists. Section 3
develops our argument on the endogenous selection of economies into regions and countries - the
average border effect is an upwardly biased estimate of the causal effect of the impact of political
integration upon trade frictions. In this section we also describe our method of dealing with this
selection bias. In Section 4 we conduct counterfactual experiments on regional borders in which
we show that, even after allowing for this selection bias, a substantial impact remains. The value
of integration across the European Union is considered in Section 5, in which we provide some
quantification for the costs of Brexit. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring Trade Frictions
In this section we show that the border effect, understood as the average difference in bilateral
frictions between interregional and international pairs within the EU, is very large. Furthermore,
the EU border effect, understood as the average difference in bilateral frictions between EU pairs
8The data used in for these graphs, and throughout the paper, is described in Appendix A
9If there are N countries, with the exports from country h to country j denoted Xhj (X
h
h ≡ 0), then the
Herfindahl Index for country h, Hh =
∑N
j=1[(X
h
j /
∑N
k=1[X
h
k ])
2]. Hh = 1 indicates complete concentration of trade
with a single trading partner. Hh → 0 indicates diversification of trade across all partners.
10The most trade concentrated independent EU member is Austria, a relatively small country which concentrates
its trade with the EU’s largest economy, Germany.
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and other country pairs, is smaller but still significant. Differences of the magnitudes that we
obtain have quantitatively significant welfare implications if they were to be interpreted as the
causal effect of borders.
Gravity models of trade are of the form:
lnXhj = γ0 + lnYh + lnYj − γhdh − γjdj +  ln δhj (1)
Many structural trade models produce such a gravity equation, in which the log of trade is
directly proportional to the log of the GDPs of the countries involved, and inversely proportional
to country fixed effects which represent the total demand from across the world for the output
from which this trade flow is drawn (often referred to as “multilateral resistance”). The residual
after allowing for GDP and multilateral resistance is the trade friction. δhj is the variable trade
costs and so  < 0 is the “trade elasticity”, i.e. the elasticity of trade volumes to variable trade
costs.
In many trade structural models, including the model that we will develop in section 4, the
trade frictions can be calibrated from the trade flow data as the “Head Ries Index” (HRI), given
by the following expression:
δhj =
(
X2hj
XhhXjj
) 1
2
(2)
A larger Head Ries Index indicates larger trade frictions and (ceterus paribus) lower trade volumes.
The HRI is the trade friction that would produce the observed bilateral trade within a gravity model
(conditional on a given value for the trade elasticity). It is a very natural and theory compatible
measure of trade frictions, and has been used many times in the literature11.
There are two considerations about the HRI that are important to remark on.
(1) Its measured value does, of course, depend on the value of the trade elasticity used. In
most of our specifications we will use the values of  that are commonly accepted in the literature
11Chen and Novy (2012) label this approach to trade friction measurement as the “Indirect Approach”. Other
papers which have used this approach include Head and Ries (2001), Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2016),
Novy (2013), Chen and Novy (2011), Head and Mayer (2004), and Jacks, Meissne, and Novy (2011). The HRI
between entities i and j is monotonically related to the iceberg cost that appears in many trade models and so is a
measure of the total trade frictions between i and j. The version of the HRI used here is that implied by models
which produce bilaterally balanced trade.
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(more on this below). Nevertheless, we will present a result that suggests that we can make a more
general claim that is not sensitive to the specific value for  that is used.
(2) It measures the frictions of trading outside your entity relative to the frictions of trading
internally within your own entity, as it is assumed that δhh ≡ 1. Therefore, we must control for
country size, as otherwise we would be biasing welfare considerations in favor of large countries,
as they “enjoy” a larger market with zero frictions by assumption. When we do comparisons we
either do it between entities of approximately the same size, or we control for the econometrically
estimated effect of size.
We perform a simple econometric exercise, regressing for all pairs of countries and regions, the
Head Ries Index measured for each bilateral pair, against the incomes of each party, the physical
distance between them (and this distance squared), a common language dummy, regional border
dummies, and a non-EU border dummy12.
First we outline the data, and then we describe the results of our exercise.
2.1 Data & Methodology
The data used in this paper is fully described in Appendix A. But briefly it is: international data
from the WIOD database covering both goods and services; regional data for the USA, Canada,
Spain, and Scotland, is taken from local statistical agencies; international, Scottish, and US data
is from 2014; Canadian data is from 2013; Basque Country (goods and services) data is from
2006; and Catalan (goods and services) data is from 2005; for the rest of Spanish Autonomous
Communities we have goods only data from 2006. The following procedure is followed to construct
an internally consistent dataset:
• From the international data we have: Xhj , the trade flow from h to j; the Gross Output, Xh,
and the GDPh, for all countries h ∈ {1, ..., N}.
12This is very similar to running a standard gravity regression of bilateral trade upon GDPs and upon dummies for
i and j, with explanatory terms for trade frictions: lnXhj− lnYh− lnYj = γ0+γhdh+γjdj+ (α1E1 + ...+ αmEm)
where dk is a dummy variable for k (so γk gives its multilateral resistance), where  is the trade elasticity, and where
E1, ..., Em are m factors with which we try to explain trade frictions. Imposing theory consistent restrictions upon
the multilateral resistance terms, and moving terms to the left hand side, the estimation equation reduces to
1

(
lnXhj − 12 lnXhh − 12 lnXjj
) ≡ ln δhj = α1E1 + ...+ αmEm, which is what we do.
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• Then define:
Xhj =
1
2
(
Xjh +X
h
j
)
(3)
Xhh = Xh −
∑
j 6=h
Xhj (4)
where (3) determines the bilateral trade interaction as the average of imports and exports13,
and (4) defines the amount of internal trade as the difference between gross output and
external trade.
• For each region in our data, we construct a data pair comprising of the region and a virtual
“rest of the country”, by applying the share of income, the share of external trade, and the
ratio of internal trade to external trade, implied by the regional dataset, to the output and
international trade from the country dataset14.
Note that when we try to measure trade frictions consistently across countries and regions and
to conduct some basic statistical analysis on these measures, the US states supply the bulk of our
regional data points. The US and Spanish regional trade datasets are for goods trade only. We
therefore use goods only data for Canada despite goods and services data being available, and we
exclude Scotland from the database at this stage. We use the ratio of, say, Texas goods trade with
the rest of the USA to its goods trade with the rest of the world, combined with the Texan share
of US goods trade with the rest of the world, to generate a consistent measure of Texas’s internal
trade, from the USA’s external combined goods and services trade. Given data limitations, this is a
reasonable procedure. But we can infer in which direction it biases our results from the Canadian,
Basque, and Catalan data, and it seems to matter quantitatively - we will come back to this. In
Section 4 we use goods and services data for Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country15.
13Note that instead of defining our measure of the trade interaction between the entities as the arithmetic average
of imports and exports, we could use the geometric average: Xhj = (X
j
hX
h
j )
1
2 . We also tried this and it made very
little difference to the estimates shown in Table 1.
14For example, Catalan output is given by Spanish output from the cross-country dataset multiplied by the ratio
of Catalan GDP to Spanish GDP from the regional dataset. Catalan trade with the rest of the world is given by
this Catalan output multiplied by the Catalan external trade to output ratio. Catalan trade with the rest of Spain
is given by this Catalan external trade multipled by the internal to external trade ratio. Finally, the figures for the
rest of Spain are given by the Spanish figures less the Catalan ones.
15It is in itself interesting that out of all the autonomous communities of Spain, the regions with substantial
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To calculate the HRI for the countries and regions in our dataset, we must choose a trade
elasticity, . There is much discussion in the literature (see e.g. Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
and Melitz and Redding (2015)) about the appropriate value for the trade elasticity, but based
loosely on Simonovska and Waugh (2014), for this exercise we choose  = −3.516. In Section 4 we
will reach a conclusion that is extremely insensitive to this choice.
2.2 Average Border Effect Results
We take logs of the set of calculated HRIs and regress against log of gross output, distance, distance
squared, common language and border dummies.17
We have three different types of border dummies. The regional border dummy takes value
1 only if it is a border between regions of the same country. The non EU border dummy takes
value 1 only if it is a border between a non EU country and another country (EU or not). Finally,
we include separate dummies for Canadian and Spanish region to region borders to account for
country fixed effects representing differential levels of internal integration between the US, Canada,
and Spain (to avoid collinearity, there is no US specific border dummy, so the coefficient on the
overall regional dummy measures the US border, whilst the coefficients on the regional dummy
plus the Canadian or Spanish dummies measures the borders for Canada or Spain respectively).
These results are shown in Table 1. The dummy variable specification chosen means that
everything is measured relative to the cross country borders between EU member states. The
positive sign on the non-EU border coefficient means that cross country borders that are not
internal to the EU are significantly more frictional than internal EU borders. The negative sign
on the regional border coefficient suggests that US internal borders are substantially less frictional
than country to country borders within the EU. The negative sign on the Canada coefficient
independence movements, Catalonia and the Basque Country, are the only two with their own local statistical
agencies that produce goods and services data.
16Simonovska and Waugh (2014) who report a range of figures for the trade elasticity based on different trade
models. Their range is from −2.8 given the model from Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), to −5.2 given
the Armington model (Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)) or Krugman (1980) model. Our chosen parameter value
is somewhere in the middle of this range and close to the figure of −3.41 which Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
estimate for the Melitz (2003) model.
17We also tried adding a common currency dummy, but the estimated coefficient on this variable was insignificant,
and its inclusion did not change the coefficients on anything else by very much at all. Therefore, we report the
results only from the specification omitting this variable.
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Coef.
Constant 4.376∗∗∗
(0.102)
distance in km 0.0001381∗∗∗
(0.0000069)
distance squared −5.65× 10−9 ∗∗∗
(0.418× 10−9)
common language −0.1613∗∗∗
(0.0363)
log(XhXj) −0.1097∗∗∗
(0.0039)
regional border −0.2101∗∗∗
(0.0511)
non EU border 0.1444∗∗∗
(0.0247)
Canada −0.2448∗∗∗
(0.0752)
Spain −0.4372∗∗∗
(0.0681)
Number of obs 984
R-squared 0.7536
Table 1: Regression results of log of δ with trade elasticity = −3.5
suggests that Canadian internal borders are less frictional than US internal borders, and the larger
in magnitude negative coefficient on the Spain dummy, suggests that Spanish internal borders even
less frictional than Canadian borders.
Note that the results in this table are highly dependent on the value of the trade elasticity,
though the significance of each factor is insensitive to this parameter.
Figure 2 shows the measured values of the HRI, adjusted for the impact of physical distance
and common language (i.e “log residual delta” is the log of the regression residual plus the impact
of size and borders, and these are graphed against size), separating out the regions-rest of country
pairs, EU country pairs, and other country pairs. As can be seen, the regional frictions are
generally lower than EU frictions, which are generally lower than other country frictions. Figure
2 shows that regions have lower frictions than countries conditional on size. That is, any pair of
countries is expected to have larger bilateral frictions than a pair of regions of the same size: there
is something about being regions of the same country that is associated with a higher degree of
integration than between equivalently sized countries (after controlling for physical distance and
common language).
As discussed earlier, the Head Ries Index trade frictions measure will show a negative relation-
ship with the size of the parties because it measures the frictions relative to internal frictions (and
the larger the country, the larger the internal frictions, so the smaller the relative difference with
11
Figure 2: Scatter plot showing bilateral trade frictions against GDP split by countries and regions
external frictions). This does not impact upon our main point, since we report the average border
effect conditional on size. We further investigate the systematic negative dependence in Appendix
B where we demonstrate that this slope can be explained purely as a result of aggregation issues.
We define the “residual delta” in Figure 3 as the measured HRI after controlling for size as
well as physical distance and common language. This figure shows that there is almost first
order stochastic dominance for regional frictions compared with EU frictions, and likewise for EU
frictions compared with other international frictions.
The difference between these CDFs is another graphical representation of the border effect.
The border effect is the fact that controlling for size, physical distance, and whether there is a
common language, the average international friction is larger than the average within-EU friction,
which itself is larger than the average inter-regional friction.
In fact we believe that the average border effect is even larger than suggested by the coefficients
in Table 1 due to the fact that we have evidence that trade in services is more home biased than
trade in goods, and our data procedure has implicitly assumed that the degree of home bias is the
same in both. We present this evidence in the next subsection.
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Figure 3: Empirical CDF of residual trade frictions between regions and between countries
2.3 Trade in Services
We have reason to suspect that this analysis is conservative due to the treatment of regional
trade in services. The use of goods only inter-regional trade makes comparison between regional
and country level frictions appear less stark than it actually is, and so is a conservative basis for
conducting this comparison. The method we have used to determine a measure of internal and
external trade for the regions that is consistent with the goods and services international trade
matrix, given goods regional trade matrices, is valid if the degree of home bias in trade in services
is the same as the degree of home bias in trade in goods. If services are more home biased, then
our proceedure is conservative: it understates internal trade if there is more home bias in trade in
services than in trade in goods.
We have goods and services trade data for the Canadian Provinces and for Catalonia and the
Basque Country. Therefore we can calculate the HRIs based on both a goods only apportionment
of the Canadian and Spanish trade data, and a goods and services apportionment of this data.
In this way we can infer if the border effect is larger considering goods and services compared to
goods only trade, and if so, how much larger. Table 2 shows the measured HRI based on a goods
and services apportionment, and for a goods trade only apportionment. As we see, every single
13
Region Natural Log of Measured HRI
Goods Only Data Goods & Services Data
Alberta 0.888 0.729
British Columbia 1.075 0.837
Manitoba 1.035 0.886
New Brunswick 1.074 0.937
Newfoundland 1.140 1.014
Northwest Territories 1.460 1.195
Nova Scotia 1.176 1.006
Nunavut 1.456 1.264
Ontario 0.867 0.661
Prince Edward Island 1.353 1.185
Quebec 0.929 0.770
Saskatchewan 1.006 0.864
Yukon 1.670 1.353
Catalonia 0.618 0.548
Basque Country 0.641 0.640
Table 2: Measured HRI for regions when apportioning international trade by regional Ratio of
internal to international trade for each region
region displays more home bias in its trade in services than it does in its trade in goods, and thus
the frictions calculated under the goods only apportionment are higher in every case. The average
of the log differences in frictions is 14%18.
Every single region displays more home bias in its trade in services than it does in its trade
in goods. Therefore, assuming that this is also true of the US states and the other Spanish
Autonomous Communities, then the differences between regional and country level frictions are
actually higher than the figures from Table 1. Assuming these results are representative and can
be applied across the US States and the other Spanish Autonomous Communities, would imply
that average differences in the log of regional and EU country frictions should be higher by an
additional 14%.
It is therefore the case that the comparison of country frictions to regional frictions that we have
performed, which shows significant differences even when controlling for obvious contributions to
trade frictions, is a conservative comparison. A further case for the conservatism of the comparison
that we do, is that sales across a border are more likely to be recorded and so we may expect any
data quality issues to bias our results against finding significant differences between regional and
country level frictions.
Summarizing. The body of evidence indicates that regional borders are systematically less
18The simple average difference is 17% while the average weighted by the size of the region-rest of country trade
flow is 14%.
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frictional than country borders: after controlling for physical distance and common language, for
any given size, frictions are systematically lower among regions than among countries (Figure
2). Controlling for size, country frictions almost first order stochastically dominate regional ones
(Figure 3). Taking into account the treatment of services increases this difference between regions
and countries further. Our analysis is thus completely in line with other analysis that show that a
substantial border effects exist: there is something that happens within countries that facilitates
trade, something that does not happen across countries.
Furthermore, a similar, but smaller, effect is seen when comparing frictions internal and external
to the European Union.
Nevertheless, the size of these effects dos not reflect the welfare gains of political union as there
are obvious selection issues (of which regions form a country and which countries join the EU) to
which we turn next.
3 Endogenous Country Formation
The estimated average difference between international frictions and interregional19 frictions is
large, but this does not mean that eliminating national borders would cause such a large fall in
frictions. This is because who shares and who does not share a state is an endogenous proposition.
Consequently, it is not obvious how to measure the trade enhancing value of sharing a state.
We have already seen that the measure of trade frictions is positively correlated with physical
distance and with language differentiation. It is likely that it is positively correlated with all
measures of population heterogeneity, and therefore in models of endogenous country formation
such as Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005), it would be those pairs who already have a low
trade friction that would select into sharing a state. This means that the average difference between
international and interregional frictions overestimates the causal effect on trade friction reduction
of sharing a state, and thus would overestimate the economic gains from political integration for
an average pair of countries. Given a relationship between low frictions and selection into state
19For easy in exposition in this section we frame discussion in terms of the region versus country border effect.
Notice though that exactly the same arguments apply in considering the impact of trading blocks like the European
Union.
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sharing, the econometric estimate for the Regions dummy in Table 1 will be biased towards being
too large (in absolute value).
Suppose that the observed frictions between two entities h and j are a function of intrinsic
characteristics of these regions and of whether they share a political union. We call their innate
characteristics as θh and θj respectively. We denote whether h and j are part of the same country
(political union) by shj. We say that shj = 1 if they are, and shj = 0 if they are not, part of the
same country. The innate characteristics of the entities, θh, refer to cultural, social, geographical
aspects that escape economic modelling and that we take as exogenous. These are things that we
assume are not altered by trade or by sharing a political union.
It is reasonable to imagine that the frictions between h and j are a function of both entities’
characteristics and of whether they share a national-state:
ln δhj = F (θh, θj) + γshj + uhj (5)
where γ would be the effect of economic integration, and uhj is some noise.
If θh and θj are independent of shj there is no problem with the estimation of equation 5. This
is, loosely, what is shown in Table 1, where F (θh, θj) is the geographic distance between h and j,
common language, etc.
The estimation conducted to obtain Table 1 has two problems, the first trivial but the second
potentially important. The trivial issue is that in our RHS variables we include only a small subset
of the factors θ that may affect trade. It is trivial because, insofar as those missing characteristics
are orthogonal to shj, the estimation of γ remains unbiased.
The substantial problem is that those characteristics (missing or not) are very likely to be
correlated with shj: which entities select into being a country is far from an exogenous proposition.
The probability of the event shj = 1, is very dependent of the affinities and similarities between
the parties. Moreover, these similarities and affinities are also very likely to affect the frictions
irrespectively of the value of shj.
Thus, when we see that regions trade more than countries, this could indicate either that
sharing a political union is a trade-enhancing “technology”, or that regions are regions (and not
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countries in our parlance) for precisely the same reason that they have high levels of bilateral trade:
they have deep and special affinities. This is, the probability of shj = 1 is a function of F (θh, θj).
Prob(shj = 1) = G(F (θh, θj))
In this case the OLS estimation of γ would suffer from upwards bias.
Given that the problem lies in determining the function Prob(shj = 1) = G(F (θh, θj)), an
intuitive approach for solving this problem is to look at the break-up of nations. Head, Mayer, and
Ries (2010) look at the erosion of colonial trade linkages after independence, and find a large fall
in trade: on average, bilateral trade is reduced by more than 60% after 30 years of independence.
However, colonies are unlikely candidates for economies who self-selected into an empire because
of low initial frictions and similarities. Rather these were enforced partnerships that reflected a
large difference in power.
Another possibility is to look at the break-up of countries in the former communist Eastern
Europe. The obvious examples are the break-ups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia20. However
this is not a promising approach because the dynamics can of course be highly idiosyncratic: in
Yugoslavia there was a war; and in any case they occur over timescales in which structural change,
that is not orthogonal to independence, occurs. The set of events comprising the fall of the Soviet
Union, the break-up of the states of the Warsaw Pact, the end of a centralised economy, and
the subsequent membership for the new states into the EU, are not independent events and their
effects can be conflated.
In order to deal with this endogeneity, one could look for sources of exogenous variation (for
example Redding and Sturm (2008) use distance from the East-West German border to quantify the
effect of integration on city growth, and Egger and Lassmann (2015) use regions on the internal
Swiss language borders to quantify the effects of a common language on trade) but it is hard
20Following the so-called “Velvet Divorce” of 1993, the share of bilateral trade in total trade fell dramatically,
with the share of total Czech exports going to Slovakia going from 22% to 8%, and the share of total Slovakian
exports going to the Czech Republic going from 42% to 13%. This is not likely simply due to the opening of
trade with the rest of the world following the fall of the Iron Curtain. The same source suggests that the share of
trade between other neighbours from the Eastern bloc, e.g. Poland and Hungary, held up much better, or actually
increased, following the opening up to trade with the rest of the world. HMTreasury (2013).
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to imagine what exogenous variation we could exploit in the case of political integration. Our
approach to control for this endogeneity is (at least in spirit) a form of regression discontinuity
analysis which attempts to locate quasi-experiments. The difference is that instead of looking
at state-disolutions and break-ups, we try to identify what we label as “marginal regions” and
“marginal countries”. These are regions of a larger country that could conceivably be independent,
and independent countries that could easily be regions of the larger country. Let h be such a
marginal region, j be the associated marginal country, R be the country of which h is a part, and
r be the rest of this country other than h (this is, R = r
⋃
h) . Then our assumption is that
F (θh, θr) ≈ F (θj, θR) and thus, γ ≈ ln δjR − ln δhr. That is, the observed difference in frictions
between such entities should be not dissimilar to the friction reduction that is caused by state
sharing. In spite of working with only a small number of examples, we arrive at a conclusion that
seems very consistent.21
We define “marginal regions” as regions within the EU with a strong and credible independence
movement. There are three such regions in our dataset: Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque
Country22. We present a methodology for determining the best counterfactual to their trade
frictions with the rest of the country to which they belong, using what we label as the “marginal
country”. We define this as the country in the data with the lowest measured bilateral friction
with the country that would be broken up upon an independence event.
This generates reasonable and interesting examples. We will conduct this exercise in Section 4,
but to give an example of our results, Ireland is determined as the marginal country with respect to
the UK, and therefore functions as the counterfactual for Scotland. The measured frictions between
Ireland and the UK represent a much smaller increase to Scotland’s measured friction with the
rest of the UK than the econometrically determined average estimated in Table 1. It does not
seem reasonable to increase the frictions that Scotland has with the rest of the UK by the average
21In any case, the traditional time series approach does not have many other observations either, as the number
of informative instances of country break-up is also extraordinarily small (despite the large increase in membership
of the UN - which is in large degree explained by decolonisation).
22On 18th September 2014 Scotland held an independence referendum in which 45% voted for independence.
The Catalan government in the last few years has made an open push for independence. In recent elections and
polls the pro-independence parties typically get 44% to 50% of the vote and they have a majority of the Catalan
Parliament. In the last elections in the Basque Country 25% of the votes went to a very openly pro-independence
party and a further 35% to a party with serious pro-independence inclinations.
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difference between regional and country frictions when this results in higher frictions than we see
for UK trade with other partners in the data. There are many special affinities between Scotland
and England that it is unreasonable to suspect that all would disappear in the hypothetical case
of independence. And if they do not all disappear they would be fostering trade between Scotland
and England to levels that you would not expect between England and (say) Finland. The causal
effect of a national border between Scotland and the rest of the UK is whatever is left beyond those
special affinities that would not disappear. In other words, we have controlled for the selection
bias on which entities are accounted into the labelling of “countries” and “regions” to the extent
that Scotland and Ireland are otherwise identical vis-a`-vis England.23
Thus, we do not propose to increase the magnitude of the frictions by the extra bit that
regions add on average once we control for language, distance and size. Our proposal is to use as
a counterfactual the lowest friction that we observe in the data that the country has with others.
In the next section we use a structural trade model to evaluate the impact that this conterfactual
experiment has upon income, and label this as the gain from the economic integration: it is closer
to the causal impact of sharing a state.
Notice also that this methodology is used to provide an estimate of the gains from economic
integration (joining a shared political space) and the costs of economic disintegration (leaving a
shared political space). We assume that it can be applied symmetrically to both the creation and
the elimination of borders. The estimate obtained mitigates the endogeneity problem of selection
into a shared political space, is thus closer to an estimate of the causal effect of sharing a political
space, and it should be applicable in non-marginal cases. So for example, the difference between the
Scottish and Irish trade frictions with the (rest of the) UK could be applied to Finland’s frictions
with the UK to model a hypothetical political integration of Finland with the UK. This would
increase Finnish-UK trade, but not to a level similar to that of Scotland’s trades with the rest of
the UK, because Finland is not a “marginal country” with respect to the UK, as Finland does not
have the same affinities with the UK as Ireland does. Nevertheless, this increase in Finnish-UK
trade is our best estimate of the impact of any putative political integration between Finland and
23In Appendix H we use the results obtained in Section 4, illustrated using the Scottish example, to suggest that
there is an additional purely economic incentive for regions with low trade frictions to integrate (this is additional
to affinities being a common factor in explaining both low trade frictions and propensity to integrate politically).
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the UK. In the long run perhaps economic integration would harmonize these affinities, but this
is outside the scope of our exercise. We take affinities as exogenous. In this sense we may be
underestimating the impact of economic integration, but we have no way of dealing with this, and
in any case we would be talking about the very long run here.
Further, in the long run steady state, it seems reasonable to us that the impact of creating
or eliminating borders should be symmetric. However, this does not imply that the dynamics are
symmetric, and for example it is possible that creating borders could be disruptive with large short
run effects overshooting the steady state impact, whereas eliminating borders may have little short
run impact with a slow approach to the steady state. We have nothing to say on these dynamics.
They are extremely interesting, but beyond the scope of our analysis.
4 Counterfactual experiments on regional borders
In this section we evaluate the welfare consequences of policy experiments applied to the “marginal
regions” of Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. We evaluate the cost to these regions
of having international borders (though still within-EU borders) with the rest of the country
of which they are part, both using the average econometric estimate, and using our “marginal
country” counterfactual. Our counterfactual approach has a lower impact than imposing the
average difference between country level and regional frictions but, as discussed, the comparison
between marginal regions and the most closely integrated independent countries is much more
informative as to the value of the extra economic integration that comes with political integration.
The first measurement of the border effect by McCallum (1995) showed it to be extremely large.
By incorporating economic theory to the analysis, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) reduced the
measured effect. By controlling for selection bias we further reduce its importance, but in this
section we show that it is still quantitatively significant. As we shall discuss, we present a result
which is insensitive to parameters (trade elasticity) and independent of model specification within
a large subset of the gravity class of modern trade models. We show that the gains from economic
integration that come with political integration are worth between a third and a half of the total
gains from trade, relative to autarky, enjoyed by the regions that we consider.
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Our procedure will be the following:
1. We calibrate a standard model to the data to obtain the implied frictions δhj that the model
needs to assign in order to explain trade patterns between pairs.
2. We find suitable “marginal regions” and “marginal countries” and thus obtain the frictions
of each “marginal region” and “marginal country” with the rest of the country to which the
“marginal region” belongs in the data. We call these δhr and δ
′
jR for marginal region and
country respectively.
3. We go back to the model, and in place of the friction that the “marginal region” has with
the rest of the country to which it belongs in the data (δhr), we substitute the friction that
the “marginal country” has with the country to which the “marginal region” belongs (δ′jR).
4. We thus evaluate GDP and trade patterns of the “marginal region” under this counterfactual.
5. We finally compare these results with the ones that we would get if, in place of the friction
between the “marginal region” and the rest of the country to which it belongs in the data
(δhr), we substituted the frictions implied by the econometric exercise of Section 2.
4.1 Model Solution and Calibration
In order to ilustrate the exercise that we perform, we use a specific model (a very standard trade
model), but it is important to notice that our results would be identical for a much larger class of
models. As we will remark later, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) show that there
exists a wide class of models (all of which generate a gravity equation), which happens to be the
vast majority of models in normal use, with which identical gains from trade would be evaluated.
Our model belongs to this family, so in spite of using this specific model to perform the exercise
and illustrate the results, our results are not contingent upon this specific model. Identical results
would be obtained using a modern Ricardian model in the spirit of Eaton-Kortum, or a model of
intra-industry trade with heterogeneous agents in the spirit of Hopenhayn-Melitz.
Formally, we use an Armington model with intermediate goods, where frictions are a iceberg
cost in moving either final goods or intermediate goods between the parties. We develop the model
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in detail in appendix C and here just present the fundamentals of the model and summarize its
solution.
• Agents preferences are determined by a CES aggregation of goods produced in all locations,
with elasticity of substitution σ: Uj =
[∑
h c
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
, where chj is consumption of good
manufactured in h and consumed by an agent in j.
• Production takes place in every location with a Cobb Douglas function using intermediate
inputs produced in all locations and labor. β is the share of intermediate goods in production,
and locations differ in the productivity of their labor and their size, which is summarized in
their supply of effective labor (Sj). Thus, the total amount of good produced in location j is
S1−βj
([∑
h i
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
)β
, where ihj are the goods made in location h and used as intermediate
inputs in location j.
• There is an iceberg cost. The goods produced in any location h are used in any other location
j as either as intermediate inputs ihj or consumption chj, but in order to get one unit of good
from h to j one has to ship δhj ≥ 1 units of which δhj − 1 get lost on the way. Along with
the bulk of the literature we assume that there is no iceberg cost when trading with yourself
(δjj = 1 ∀j) and that frictions are symmetric (δhj = δjh ∀h, j)
In the equilibrium of the model thus described, there is a gravity equation of the form:
Xhj =
1
1− β
YhYj
(DhDj)
1
2
δ1−σhj
where Xhj are the (nominal) exports from h to j, Yj is nominal GDP of location j and Dj is a term
which in the trade jargon is referred to as “multilateral resistance”.24 Taking logs of this gravity
equation reveals that the trade elasticity, , in this model is 1− σ.
In order to calibrate the model we find the values of {δhj, Sj} ∀h, j such that for a given value
of σ, and using {δhj, Sj} ∀h, j as parameters, the model generates values of Xhj and Yh that match
the data.
24Formally, in our model Dh = Ph
∑
k
(
Ph
Pk
)−σ
δ1−σhk
(
Yk
Pk
)
, where Ph is the price index for location h (everything
is denominated in a common currency, say dollars)
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In appendix C we present the detail of this exercise. It is important to remark the following
result:
Result 1 (HRI are frictions). Equilibrium exports and GDP are such that δhj =
(
X2hj
XhhXjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
This is, in the model the Head Ries Index is identical to the frictions (iceberg cost) between
locations. Consequently, when the model is calibrated to the data the value that the model assigns
to the trade frictions between any pair h, j is exactly the HRI for that pair that we have calculated
in Section 2. Moreover, this is true not only for our model but for a much larger family of models,
essentially those that generate a gravity equation, as shown in Head and Mayer (2014).25,26
Thus, we use the model in order to map from the data (all trade flow and GDP data) into the
parameters of the model: values of effective labor in all countries27 {Sj : ∀j} and bilateral frictions
between any pair {δhj : ∀h, j}. To do so we assume a certain value of the elasticity of substitution,
σ. Specifically we use σ = 4.5 so that the value of the trade elasticity,  = 1 − σ = −3.5 (as in
section 2) consistent with the standard values for the trade elasticity derived in Simonovska and
Waugh (2014). In any case we will show that our qualitative results are independent of the value
of σ used. Thus, we can think of this calibration procedure as an algorithm mapping data into
parameters.
Let us remark on what our procedure is here. Given a set of parameters the model produces
a set of simulated data. The parameters that we get from the calibration are those for which the
“simulated data” is exactly equal to the real data as there is a unique mapping from the data to the
parameters and vice versa. Moreover, we can do counterfactual exercises by changing parameters
in the model from those implied by the data. Counterfactual parameters generate counterfactual
GDP, which allow us to analyze the welfare impacts of such an exercise.
25For instance, Comerford, Myers, and Rodr´ıguez-Mora (2014) perform a similar exercise with a Melitz model
and Caselli, Koren, Lisicky, and Tenreyro (2017) do it in a Eaton-Kortum model. As their models have a gravity
equation, they all get the same relationship between the HRI and frictions.
26Note further that while Result 1 is not our result and is ubiquitous across the literature, it is an important result
to establish for our exercise. This is not only to tie together the model used in this section with the trade frictions
used in the econometric exercise of Section 2, but also to establish the validity of our counterfactual experiment
exercises. It is vital that we are imposing counterfactual model parameters rather than endogenous objects. The
HRI defined in terms of observed trade flows maps onto the exogenous, parametric iceberg costs in the model, and
not into any function of equilibium prices etc. Therefore it is a suitable object with which to perform counterfactual
experiments in the model.
27Which measures the size and productivity levels in each location.
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4.2 Determining Counterfactuals
In principle we could perform our exercise with any region for which we have regional trade data
available. Nevertheless, it seems more reasonable to do it for those regions that could plausibly
become an independent countries given the current political realities. Thus, we use as “marginal
regions” Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. We have detailed regional data, including
trade in services, for the three of them as described in Appendix A.
We will use two sets of counterfactuals.
Firstly, we perform what we deem the “marginal” counterfactual exercise. It consists of iden-
tifying the least frictional trading partner (lowest measured HRI) of the country to which the
marginal region belongs, the “marginal” country. This is, we identify the country with the lowest
frictions vis a vis Spain (as a counterfactual for both Catalonia and the Basque Country) and the
UK (as a counterfactual for Scotland). These countries are Portugal and Ireland respectively.
The fact that the counterfactual trading pairs are similar in size to the trading pairs upon
which we are conducting these policy experiments gives further validity to these counterfactual
exercises beyond their intuitive appeal. In any case (in particular, with respect to size, for the case
of the Basque Country) we adjust the implied counterfactual frictions of the “marginal country”
by size and distance using the coefficients estimated in Section 2.28
Let h be the region, j be the counterfactual, R be the country of which h is a part, and r be
the rest of this country other than h. We measure δhr and δjR from data using the model, and then
define δ′jR by adjusting δjR for size and distance using the difference in size and distance between
our “marginal region” and “marginal country” and the coefficients in Table 1.
Our second set of counterfactuals is the one derived from running an econometric exercise,
increasing the value of δhr by the amount obtained in table 1. We call this the “average” counter-
factual scenario (δavehr )
We calculate the “Average Impact” (δavehr ) as the measured HRI for the Region-Rest of Country
28The adjusted counterfactual could also control for language. We opted not to do so as both Catalonia and the
Basque Country have their own languages, as Portugal does, and in both Ireland and Scotland their own languages
are extremely minoritarian. Nevertheless we performed the same exercise assigning different language to Portugal
and Spain but the same language between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, which could be thought as the more
complicated case on this respect. To do this does not change the results in any significant manner, see footnote 31.
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pair adjusted by the average border effect in table 1, as well as by the 14% trade in services impact
from Table 2. For Catalonia and the Basque Country, we augment it further by the observed by
the Spain fixed factor in table 1.
The marginal counterfactual implements the discussion of Section 3: this is our proposed
correction for the endogeneity of country formation which will bias the econometric estimates that
determine the average counterfactual.
4.2.1 No Substitution
Before we conduct our policy experiments, we consider another reason why the difference between
international and inter-regional frictions (both calculated as the econometric average, or as the
difference between marginal countries and marginal regions) could over-estimate the impact of
political integration upon economic integration. It could be thought that regions have lower
frictions with the rest of the country to which they belong at the expense of larger frictions with
the rest of the world. This “substitution” in frictions could in principle be a reflection that close
ties with a partner foster close links with it, but by not interacting with others, you get further
apart from them. In such a case the role of political integration for fostering trade integration
could be overstated, even with our way of controlling for endogeneity of country formation.
We investigate this by looking at the three marginal regions of our dataset within a “three
country” framework: the multilateral dataset is aggregated up in each case so that we are con-
sidering the three by three trade matrix involving the region, the rest of its nation, and the rest
of the world. The results of doing this are compared against the equivalent for every country in
the dataset, where the three by three trade matrix now involves the country, its most integrated
trading partner (lowest measured frictions29), and the rest of the world. The results are presented
in Figures 4a and 4b. We can see that the regions have roughly the expected level of trading
frictions with respect to the rest of the world, but lower than expected frictions with their most
integrated trading partner (which is the rest of their nation).
In the data, regions differ from countries in the frictions that they have with their main partner,
29We do this after controlling for size since the negative relationship between size and frictions is an aggregation
issue (see Appendix B) rather than a real feature of close integration.
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(a) Regions are better than expected at trading with their most
integrated trading partner
(b) Regions do not seem to be any worse than expected at trade
with the rest of the world
Figure 4: HRIs with main trading partner and with rest of the world
not in the frictions that they have with the rest of the world. We do not find that our marginal
regions are systematically less integrated into the global economy than are independent countries
of the same size. It does not seem to be the case that regions get their extraordinarily low frictions
with the rest of their country at the expense of larger frictions with the rest of the world. Instead,
the close economic integration across regional borders is on top of normal trade links with the rest
of the world. Thus, there is no reason to think that altering the political integration of a region
with the rest of the country to which belongs would alter the frictions with the rest of the world.
4.3 Counterfactual Experiments
In Table 3 we perform our first set of counterfactual experiments. The first set of columns (headed
“Trade Frictions”) show the frictions that we will use to perform the experiments. The first one
shows the friction between the “marginal region” and the rest of the country where it belongs
(δhr). The second column shows the friction of the “marginal country” with the country of which
the region is part (δ′jR). Finally the third column shows the friction between the “marginal region”
and the rest of the country to which it belongs when augmenting δhr by the econometric value of
not sharing a state (δavehr ).
The second set of columns shows the welfare impact (change in real GDP) on each “marginal
region” of imposing δ′jR (our marginal counterfactual) and δ
ave
hr (our average counterfactual), leaving
all other parameters constant.30
30Every figure in this Table 3 is of course sensitive to the value chosen for the trade elasticity, here  = 1−σ = −3.5
as previously.
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Measured Welfare Impact
Trade Frictions of Counterfactual
(HRI) “Marginal” “Average”
δhr δ
′
jR δ
ave
hr δ
′
jR δ
ave
hr
Scotland (Ireland) 2.067 2.707 2.947 -8.5% -9.8%
Catalonia (Portugal) 1.730 3.990 3.819 -12.5% -13.7%
Basque C. (Portugal) 1.897 3.066 4.189 -15.9% -18.3%
Table 3: Counterfactual Experiments, with trade elasticity = −3.5
For example, in the first row we look at the effects of substituting the frictions that Scotland (the
“marginal region”) has with the Rest of the UK (δhr) for (i) the frictions that Ireland (the marginal
country) has with the UK (δ′jR), and (ii) the frictions that we would impute to the Scotland-UK
border if instead we were to use as a counterfactual the average effect from the econometric exercise
of Table 1 (δavehr ). The welfare change derived from these two exercises are displayed in the fourth
and fifth column respectively. In both counterfactual exercises the productivity of workers in
Scotland, the rest of the UK and the rest of the world is kept constant at the same level that
we obtain in our calibration of the data. Likewise, the bilateral frictions between all pairs except
the one for which we perform the experiment are also kept constant at the value assigned in
the calibration. The following two rows perform the same exercise for Catalonia and the Basque
Country using Portugal as their marginal country.
Before discussing the results it is interesting to notice that our marginal counterfactual seems
to generate reasonable artificial economies. As we have seen the trade patterns of our marginal
regions do not look at all like the trade patterns of independent countries with the same size, as
evidenced in figures 1b and 4. A reasonable counterfactual demands that once the political ties are
severed, the resulting simulated economies generate trade patterns that could reasonably be drawn
from the same distribution than the ones observed in the data: our exercise consist in making the
regions look as normal countries.
In Figure 5b we augment Figure 4 with the frictions of our counterfactual exercises. Clearly,
in the data the regions are unusual, but the imputed values in our counterfactuals (particularly in
the Marginal case) are within the range of normal.
In Figure 5a we show the Herfindhal Index of trade concentration in the data and in our
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Herfindahl Index of trade concentration and HRI with main partner as a function of size. Plots
the values in the data and in our counterfactual exercises.
simulated economies under both counterfactuals. The exceptionality of the regions disappears in
our counterfactual experiments: they look like the other countries. If anything, in the marginal
counterfactual, the relationship between (say) Scotland with England is still a bit more special
than what you normally find between countries (due to their special affinities, independent from
political arrangements), but in the ballpark of normality.
Thus, we have established that our counterfactuals, especially the marginal counterfactual, are
a good approximation to the effects of severing political ties. There is a set of very clear and
interesting lessons that can be learned from performing these experiments.
Result 2 (Endogeneity Correction). The frictions of our “marginal” counterfactuals are lower
than those implied by an econometric exercise that produces average effects.
This is the sense in which our exercise corrects the selection bias. It would not be reasonable to
expect that after a hypothetical Scottish independence, that the trade frictions between Scotland
and England were to become as large as the ones that the UK has with the average of its other
trading partners. The welfare impacts based on the counterfactual marginal countries are conse-
quently lower than the impact of imposing the average difference between country and regional
frictions.
Result 3 (Large Gains of Integration). Once we control for endogeneity of country formation, the
remaining gains for trade associated with sharing a national state are still very large.
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Even after controlling for the deep affinities between places by assigning as a counterfactual
the lowest relevant frictions observable in the data (the “marginal country”), it seems to be the
case that sharing a state is a very powerful trade enhancing technology.
In Table 3 (contingent upon a value of 1− σ = −3.5 as before) the losses associated with the
breaking up political ties are 8.5% for Scotland, 12.5% for Catalonia31 and of 16% for the Basque
Country. These numbers, albeit smaller than the ones generated by the average counterfactual,
are still extremely large.
They come as a consequence of the loss of the ability to trade with a partner at an extraordinary
low friction. At such a low friction the economy concentrates its trade with such a partner to an
extraordinary degree. Once that political link is cut, the trade between both is still very large,
as they are still the partner with the lowest frictions. Nevertheless the frictions in the marginal
counterfactual are much larger than before, and this translates into a massive change in trade
patterns.
The economy of the “marginal region” did enjoy a diversified consumption at a low cost,
and with an elasticity of substitution of 4.5 this amounts to a large gain. Notice that it is just
the difference in the frictions with the main partner (in the case of Scotland moving from 2.067
to 2.707) what produces this gain. This is because this increase (in this case of 0.640) does
not happen with any random partner, but with the one with whom you had an extraordinarily
profitable relationship, and where, as a consequence, you were concentrating the bulk of your
trade. Once this extraordinary relationship disappears, your trade with this partner, being large
falls into the range of the usual. The loss is partially compensated by an increase in exports and
imports with the rest of the world32 (but that involves paying a large trade cost, which makes it
less profitable) and for an increase in domestic sales33 (but where you do not enjoy the benefits of
diversification and increased variety). These can not compensate, in welfare terms, for the loss of
the exceptionally low frictions.
31When we adjust the frictions including a “same language” dummy for Catalonia, the associated loss is 12%
instead.
32 The ratio of trade with the RoW to GDP moves from 25% in the data to 28% in the “marginal counterfactual”
33 They move from 68% of gross output in the data to 78% in the “marginal counterfactual”.
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4.4 Generality of the results
There are two assumptions that we have made that could, in principle, affect our findings: we have
used a specific model, and we have assumed a certain value for the trade elasticity. Next we show
that (i) all models that generate a gravity equation (arguably the vast majority of trade models)
would generate the same results that we find, and (ii) that our qualitative results are very stable
and unaffected by the elasticity that it is assumed.
4.4.1 Model Selection
In a very influential paper Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) have shown the re-
markable result that conditional on the elasticity of trade to frictions ( in our parlance), the gains
from trade are the same in a large set of models: all those that generate a gravity equation. This
is, how much does one benefit from having lower frictions is the same number in all models that
belong to this family given a value of . Clearly, in different models the explanation of why you
gain from trade is different, but in all of them you end up with the same measured gains.34,35
For instance, the Eaton-Kortum model is a modern version of the Ricardian model, and it
generates a gravity equation. Consequently, one can interpret the gains from trade as the gains
from consuming diverse products while specializing in the production on the ones in which you
have comparative advantage.
On the other hand, models of intra-industry trade in the Hopenhayn-Melitz tradition also
generate a gravity equation. In this context the gains from having lower frictions with other
location arise from a totally different mechanism. Lower frictions imply more competition with
foreign producers and allows the more efficient local producers to export more, increasing their
profits, and increasing their demand for inputs. The less efficient local producers find themselves
trapped between increased foreign competition pushing down prices for their output, and increased
domestic competition from efficient local producers pushing up prices for their inputs. Trade
34Whether the gains are exactly the same is conditional upon some elements of the model like the inclusion or
otherwise of trade in intermediates, multiple sectors, etc, as described in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(2012).
35For example, Comerford, Myers, and Rodr´ıguez-Mora (2014) used the basic Melitz (2003) model (which is in
the general class of models described in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012)) as well as using older
data, and obtained very similar results.
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improves welfare as it improves the quality of firms: it works as an increase of competition.
The beauty of the ACR result is that it recognises that both these model generate a gravity
equation of the same form - though with an entirely different structural interpretation on the
elasticity of trade to frictions. The implication is that given any specific value for this elasticity,
both models would predict the same gains from trade for a given change in frictions, even if the
reasons that they argue for the existence of those gains are completely different. All models within
the ACR class of models generate the same welfare results, given a particular value of . Our model
also generates a gravity equation and is within the ACR class. Consequently all these models would
generate the same results as generated by our model.
In other words, you should not judge our results for the specifics of our model, except for the
fact that it generates a gravity equation. All other models that do (Eaton-Kortum, or Melitz, for
instance) would produce the same gains from integration.
4.4.2 Stability of Results to Parameter Selection
Going back to our results, notice that they are calculated assuming a trade elasticity of  = −3.5
(this is, a elasticity of substitution between goods of σ = 4.5) as suggested by Simonovska and
Waugh (2014). If the elasticity of substitution were assumed instead to be very large, the effects
of increasing the frictions with your main partner would be small, as you could simply substitute
for goods from other countries, or from your own, without much cost. On the other hand, if the
elasticity of substitution were much smaller, by increasing the frictions we would force a much
larger cost due to the lost in variety in consumption: local goods are a bad substitute of external
goods. The value of  (and thus σ) that we have assumed is understood to be reasonable in the
literature, but there are no certainties on this respect.
The magnitude of the gain from integration that we find would, thus, depend in an obvious
manner of this assumption. Nevertheless there is an interesting sense in which our results are
independent from the elasticity of substitution assumed.
Result 4. The loss associated with the “marginal counterfatual” for the “marginal region” is
between 1/3 and 1/2 of the total gains from trade that the marginal region has (relative to be in
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Welfare Impact / cost autarky
 = −2.8  = −3.5  = −5.2
Scotland (Ireland) 39% 38% 38%
Catalonia (Portugal) 42% 42% 41%
Basque C. (Portugal) 48% 47% 46%
Table 4: Welfare changes as a proportion of overall gains from trade are insensitive to changes in
the trade elasticity
autarky) irrespectively of the trade elasticity assumed.
In Table 4 we compare the loss derived from moving from δjr to δ
′
jR for each “marginal region”
(i.e. moving the Scotland-England friction to the same value as the Ireland-UK friction, but not
moving the Scotland’s friction with anywhere else) with the loss derived from moving Scotland
into autarky. Autarky is calculated by moving the frictions that the “marginal region” has with all
other partners, not only with the rest of the country where it belongs towards infinity (i.e. Scotland
can not trade with England, or with any other place on Earth).36 We perform this exercise for a
range of values of the trade elasticity, and it is clearly noticable that the results are remarkably
stable. Varying the trade elasticity makes trade more or less important for welfare, but it is always
the case that the gains from trade associated with sharing a state are a fraction of between a third
and a half of the total value of gains from trade relative to autarky.
This insensitivity of the results to changes in the trade elasticity is implied by insensitivity
of trade flows to the elasticity as described by Section V of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Changing the trade elasticity will change the trade impact of a given change in frictions, or the
welfare impact of a given change in trade. However, conditioning on a counterfactual which is
based on an observation in the data means that different trade elasticities imply different changes
in frictions such that the implied change in trade flows is not greatly affected. Further, whilst the
welfare impact of this implied trade flow change is a strong function of the trade elasticity, it is a
fairly constant proportion of the total gains from trade relative to autarky.
Thus, we can conclude that the gains from trade due to political integration into relatively
larger political units accrue for a large percentage of the total gains from trade of regions, and this
36We show in appendix G that the welfare gains with respect to autarky can be expressed in a simple formula.
As Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) show, this formula applies to all models generating a gravity
equation.
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is so irrespectively of the trade elasticity.
5 EU Integration and Brexit
In this section we look at the degree of integration that the EU provides, the potential costs of
losing such integration and the potential benefits of furthering that integration.
We start by performing exercises similar to the ones of the previous section, the difference being
that instead of looking at the creation of hypothetical internal borders within countries of the EU,
we look at the effects of a hypothetical departure from the EU. Or perhaps not that hypothetical,
as the UK voted to leave the European Union and is set to formally do so during 2019.
One could argue that augmenting the frictions between the UK and the rest of the EU by the
average impact of EU membership on bilateral frictions estimated in the econometric exercise of
Section 2, will overestimate the effects of Brexit for the same reasons that we exposed in section
3: Britain has belonged to the EU for 45 years because of the large degree of affinities with the
rest of EU countries, and those affinities are not likely to disappear as a consequence of Brexit.
We consider a set of counterfactual scenarios which are informative about the potential costs of
Brexit.
We then consider the gains provided by the existence of the EU to its members, and what
would be the costs of the dissolution of the EU.
Finally, and for the shake of completeness, we revisit the possibility of independence for Scotland
under different hypothetical arrangements vis-a-vis the EU.
5.1 Brexit Scenarios
A difficulty in trying to make reasonable counterfactuals for the effects of Britain leaving the UK
is the degree of uncertainty on the eventual arrangement. The costs are unlikely to be the same
for staying within the single market (in an EEA type arrangement such as that of Norway), having
extensive bilateral arrangements that amount to the same (as Switzerland does), or remaining
within the customs union (Turkey has a customs union with the EU for manufacturing goods,
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δ Country EU δ Country EU δ Country EU δ Country EU
4.229 LUX 1 4.387 EST 1 4.519 PRT 1 4.968 KOR 0
4.241 HUN 1 4.402 POL 1 4.520 LVA 1 4.987 USA 0
4.247 MLT 1 4.422 LTU 1 4.525 CYP 1 5.006 CAN 0
4.289 BEL 1 4.456 DNK 1 4.538 FIN 1 5.056 MEX 0
4.298 CZE 1 4.462 CHE 0 4.550 ITA 1 5.100 CHN 0
4.307 SVK 1 4.469 BGR 1 4.555 ESP 1 5.100 BRA 0
4.313 NLD 1 4.470 SWE 1 4.565 GBR 1 5.122 IND 0
4.317 IRL 1 4.491 FRA 1 4.640 TUR 0 5.136 AUS 0
4.363 DEU 1 4.505 ROU 1 4.694 GRC 1 5.187 JPN 0
4.369 SVN 1 4.507 NOR 0 4.746 RUS 0 5.193 IDN 0
4.370 AUT 1 4.512 HRV 1 4.943 TWN 0
Table 5: Residual Frictions with EU after controlling for size of both parties (residuals frictions with rest of the
EU if the country belongs to the EU). Residuals frictions given by ln δ − αlnXX × lnXX, where αlnXX is the
coefficient on log (XhXj) from Table 1.
though not for agricultural products), as to having the same frictions that two (albeit good)
neighbors who are simply both members of the WTO, would be expected to have. In order to
clarify matters we produce a set of possible scenarios, measure their impact, and let the reader use
their own criteria for evaluating how reasonable each of these counterfactuals are.
In Table 5 we order countries by their measured frictions with the EU, once corrected by size.
If the country is a member of the EU, we report its frictions with the rest of the EU. There are
two things to note in this table. First, notice that the UK is amongst the less integrated countries
with the rest of the EU. The implied frictions with the rest of the EU are larger than for all other
countries of the EU except Greece. Second, the non EU countries with the smallest frictions with
the EU are Switzerland, Norway, Turkey and Russia (in that order) which makes some sense in
terms of their degree of institutional integration with the EU.
As a matter of comparison, in Table 6 we present the result of some counterfactual exercises of
the type that we performed in the previous section. Here we define “marginal countries” as non
EU members highly integrated with the EU, and “marginal regions” as the EU countries which
are their most natural counterparts. Notice that Austria “becoming like” Switzerland or Sweden
“becoming like” Norway have relatively small (albeit not insignificant) effects on GDP (of course,
they have larger effects on the size of trade flows with the EU). Poland “becoming like” Russia has
much larger negative consequential effects. The case of Greece “becoming like” Turkey is somewhat
surprising, since Turkey measured friction with the EU is lower than Greece’s. We are skeptical
about this last result, as it might be related to the specific economic circumstances of Greece since
2010, and in what follows we will ignore comparisons with Greece, and any consideration of Turkey.
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Mg region⇒Mg country δhr ⇒ δ′jR Welfare Change
Austria ⇒ Switzerland 2.654⇒ 2.852 −2.6%
Sweden ⇒ Norway 2.862⇒ 3.032 −1.5%
Poland ⇒ Russia 2.649⇒ 3.290 −5.4%
Bulgaria ⇒ Russia 3.596⇒ 3.593 +0.0%
Romania ⇒ Russia 3.278⇒ 3.474 −1.5%
Greece ⇒ Turkey 3.988⇒ 3.384 +3.3%
Table 6: Some Hypothetical exercises within the EU. Implied effect on GDP of the “marginal region” of substituting
the frictions with the rest of the EU for the frictions that the counterfactual country (“marginal country”) has with
the EU.
Marginal Region Marginal Country log difference
Austria vs Switzerland 2.654 2.852 0.0719
Sweden vs Norway 2.862 3.032 0.0575
Poland vs Russia 2.649 3.290 0.2165
Bulgaria vs Russia 3.596 3.593 -0.0007
Romania vs Russia 3.278 3.474 0.0579
Mean Value 0.0736
Table 7: Frictions with the EU of selected countries along with the frictions with the rest of the EU of selected
counterparts.
In table 7 we report the value of the frictions between “marginal regions and “marginal coun-
tries” in the European context. For Switzerland the natural choice is Austria, and for Norway it is
Sweden. As discussed, we drop the Greece-Turkey comparison. The best counterparts for Russia
are probably Poland, Bulgaria, or Romania. Notice that the mean differences in log frictions,
0.073637 is much lower than the average effect of the EU on log frictions, which is 0.1444 from
Table 1. This is consistent with endogenous selection into the EU, and suggests that to imply an
increase of frictions to be equal to the average effect of the EU on frictions as a consequence of
Brexit could overestimate its effects, as discussed in section 3.
We define the “marginal counterfactual” experiment as an increase in the (log) frictions between
the UK and the rest of the EU of 0.0736, which is the mean value from Table 7.
Alternatively, we define the “average counterfactual” experiment as an increase in the (log)
frictions between the UK and the rest of the EU of 0.1444, which is the econometrically estimated
value from Table 1.
In Table 8 we show that the “marginal counterfactual” experiment produces a fall of UK GDP
of 1.0%, compared with a 1.7% fall suggested by the “average counterfactual” experiment.
Notice that the implied “marginal counterfactual” experiment does not take into account any of
37This is the mean of the figures for ‘Austria vs Switzerland’, ‘Sweden vs Norway’, and the mean of the three ‘...
vs Russia’ figures. The simple mean of all 5 figures is 0.0806.
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Counterfactual δUK−EU ∆ of log δ δ′UK−EU Welfare Change
“Marginal Counterfactual” 2.668 0.0736 2.871 -1.0%
“Average Counterfactual” 2.668 0.1444 3.082 -1.7%
Table 8: Marginal and Average Counterfactual Experiments
the specificities of the relationship between the UK and the EU. In particular it does not account
for the fact that the UK is a large supplier of financial services to the rest of the Union. Not
only has the UK the largest financial sector share in GDP of all the G7 countries (and more than
twice Germany’s share), but the contribution of UK financial services exports to GDP is also the
highest. This is a sector very sensitive to regulation, and the new political realities in Europe as
a consequence of the UK not having political representation in the Union, open the possibility of
regulatory changes likely to decrease the relative advantage that the UK has now in the sector.
We have seen in section 2.3 that trade in services is typically much more home-biased than goods
trade. It is likely to be the case that this is also the case across the EU border, particularly given
that the political sphere for regulation in those matters lies in Brussels more than in country states.
It seems reasonable to expect regulatory changes making it more difficult for the UK to export
financial services to the EU once the voice of Britain ceases to be heard in Europe and once British
interests are not accounted for in the EU political process. To properly account for those facts lies
beyond the scope of this paper, but those realities should be taken into account when considering
the possible consequences of Brexit.
An alternative, and perhaps more natural, counterfactual for the UK after Brexit are non Eu-
ropean countries that share many cultural, social and political similarities with the UK. Countries
like Canada, USA or Australia. A further natural counterfactual is Russia since post-Brexit, the
UK and Russia will be the two large, culturally European, countries that border the EU. In Table
9 we present the results of the exercise of substituting the frictions that the UK has with the rest
of the union by the frictions that USA, Canada, Australia and Russia have with the EU (after
controlling for size and distance). The effects on UK’s GDP range from decreases of around 1.1%
(if the counterfactual is the USA) to 3.5% (if it is Australia).38
In Figure 6 we summarise these results and show how the welfare impact upon the UK of
38That this before the implementation of any possible free trade agreement between Canada and the EU
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Mg region⇒Mg country δhr ⇒ δ′jR Welfare Change
UK ⇒ USA 2.668⇒ 2.905 −1.1%
UK ⇒ Canada 2.668⇒ 3.674 −2.9%
UK ⇒ Australia 2.668⇒ 4.247 −3.5%
UK ⇒ Russia 2.668⇒ 3.024 −1.5%
Table 9: Counterfactuals for the UK outside Europe. Frictions of the counterfactual “Marginal Country” are
corrected by size and distance.
Figure 6: UK real income as a function of the trade friction with the rest of the EU.
Brexit depends on the frictions that the UK may have with the rest of the EU. There, we mark
hypothetical values of δ and the corresponding welfare imapct upon the UK. The hypothetical
frictions that we mark are (1) the frictions that the UK has currently with the EU. If these were
to be the frictions after Brexit (i.e., no change at all in frictions), there would be of course no
change in welfare. (2) The frictions resulting from adding to the UK-EU frictions, the “marginal
counterfactual” described above, and the “average counterfactual” from Table 1. These result in
a loss of about 1.0% and 1.7% of GDP respectively. And (3), the US-EU, Russia-EU, Canada-
EU and Australia-EU frictions (all translated to the UK-EU friction by correcting for size and
distance). Imputing these frictions to the UK-EU border would result in a loss to the UK of 1.1%,
1.5%, 2.9% and 3.5% of GDP respectively.
Thus, one can conclude that the steady state effects of Brexit on trade are likely to produce a
significant, albeit by no means disastrous, reduction in British GDP ranging from 1.0% to 3.5%.
Other more systematic and econometric estimates of the impacts of multilateral trading blocks
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have been conducted, that for example exploit the variation across time in entry and exit into
trading arrangements (see e.g. Baier and Bergstrand (2007)). However, our analysis of this issue
in the context of Brexit, produces results that are consistent with other economic estimates which
have been generated: Sampson (2017) surveys the literature and finds that plausible estimates of
the costs of Brexit to the UK lie in the range of 1%− 10% of GDP. For instance, Dhingra, Huang,
Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson, and Reenen (2017) find that structural model estimates which only
change trading frictions upon Brexit (such as those conducted in this paper) produce costs in the
range 1%− 3%. They also find that reduced form estimates (which may also reflect trade impacts
upon productivity and technology, capital accumulation and FDI, and immigration) produce costs
of Brexit to the UK in the range 6%−9% of GDP. This is consistent with the arguments in Brooks
and Pujolas (2017), which in a dynamic general equilibrium trade model produce larger gains from
trade than estimates based on static models, due to the dynamic adjustment of capital. Other
estimates of the costs of Brexit include those of Steinberg (2017), Ebell and Warren (2016) and
Ebell, Hurst, and Warren (2016), who find impacts on GDP of 1%− 4%.
Despite considering a number of counterfactual scenarios here to model the UK exit from the
EU, none produce losses of the magnitude seen for the exercises in which regions became like
countries. The impacts that we get are almost of an order of magnitude lower.
Result 5. The welfare loss associated leaving the EU is much smaller than the welfare loss asso-
ciated with regions becoming countries.
5.2 The Aggregate effects of the EU
The fact that the magnitude of the effects of leaving the EU (from the previous section) are much
smaller than the effects of regions becoming independent and both parties remaining in the EU (as
reported in section 4) does not imply that the existence of the EU has small effects on welfare. In
this section we perform counterfactual exercises showing (i) that the effects of the EU on welfare
are considerable, particularly for small countries, but that (ii) the effects of decreasing the frictions
within the EU to those in line with those that regions of the same country have between them
could be extremely large indeed (again, particularly for small countries).
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Figure 7: Welfare effects in all countries of increasing log δ of EU-EU borders by the “marginal”
effect, +0.0736, of the EU.
We first do the exercise of considering that all the countries within the EU increase the frictions
between themselves by the “marginal” effect that the EU has on frictions (i.e., an increase of the
log δhj of 0.0736 for all country pairs where both i and j belong to the EU). This has three types
of effects: (i) it obviously increases the frictions between the pairs, reducing their welfare, (ii) it
produces general equilibrium aggregate demand effects, as the economies affected by the increase
in frictions sum to a substantial amount of world GDP, and (iii) it produces a change in terms of
trade benefiting non EU countries (whose goods become more demanded as former EU members
have more difficulty trading among themselves). This sums to a decrease of World GDP of 0.3%,
but this change is very unevenly distributed. Non EU countries have a very small increase of 0.01%
of GDP, while EU GDP suffers a decrease of 1.7%. In Figure 7 we plot the effect for all countries
along with the country size. For small European countries the loss is substantial (close to 5% in
some cases) while for larger countries it is much smaller. In the case of the UK the implied loss is
of 0.95%39.
39The Brexit only loss for the UK is 0.97%. In the case of EU disintegration following Brexit, we can imagine the
UK suffering the 0.97% loss on Brexit which is then followed by the disintegration of the EU. When the EU falls
apart, the UK (which is already outside the EU) experiences two offsetting effects: the first is a further fall in GDP
as its EU trading partners suffer a loss and demand from these countries falls; the second is a trade diversion effect
- the EU countries used to trade more with each other, but as their borders become more frictional, some of these
purchases are instead made from non-EU countries. The (positive) trade diversion effect dominates the (negative)
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Figure 8: Welfare effects in all countries of decreasing log δ of EU-EU borders by -0.2700 for
within-country level integration.
We next turn to do the opposite exercise. We decrease the log frictions between all pairs of EU
countries by 0.2700, which is the difference in log frictions between Ireland and Scotland vis-a-vis
the UK. We use this difference as it is the smallest of the differences over the three case studies
that we looked at, and so is a conservative estimate of what we propose as the effect of integration
within a country. That is, we decrease log frictions by 0.2700 whenever both parties are in the EU.
As a consequence, world GDP would increase by a substantial 2.3%, but again this increase would
be unevenly distributed. Countries outside of the EU see a slight decrease in their GDP of 0.1%
as a consequence of suffering a real depreciation, while EU GDP increases by 10.9%. In Figure 8
we plot the effect for all countries along with the country size. The implied increase in welfare for
small European countries is huge, with a smaller but still substantial impact on larger countries.
As a benchmark, for the UK the increase is 6.2%.
The corollary of all this is that, even although the effects of the EU are substantial (because it
decreases frictions between its members), there is a large difference between the frictions across the
countries of the EU, and the friction within countries. Moreover, the welfare implications of those
remaining frictions within countries seem to be almost an order of magnitude larger, and further
effect of the fall in income of EU countries, and we see that the overall impact of EU disintegration, -0.95%, is
slightly less bad for the UK than a simple Brexit scenario, -0.97%.
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integration between EU members could produce large welfare gains. This is entirely consistent
with other results reported in the literature, such as Nitsch (2000). We do not speculate on the
sources of this difference, other than to note that the existence of strong integration within a
country the size of the USA suggests that size is not a factor here, rather there is either something
special that countries achieve in terms of integration that the EU does not manage to replicate,
or the EU is as yet too young, and these integration benefits have not yet had time to materialise.
5.3 Independence and EU membership
As an example of this almost order of magnitude difference between the welfare implications of
within country frictions relative to the frictions between EU members, we revisit the case of Scottish
independence. Following the “No” vote in the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014, this
issue may have been thought to have been resolved for a long period of time. However, with
Scotland voting to “Remain” in the EU, while the UK-wide vote was to “Leave”, in 2016’s Brexit
Referendum, Brexit has pushed the issue of Scottish independence back on to the political agenda.
In this subsection we consider the “choice” now facing Scotland between “Brexit-ing” the EU along
with the rest of the UK, or opting for independence and remaining within the EU. In Table 10 we
report the implied changes in Scottish and rUK GDP for these two different policy experiments.
The first row conveys Brexit, while Scotland remains in the UK. The frictions for both Scotland
and the rest of the UK with the rest of the EU increase by the “marginal” effect (increase log δ by
0.0736) while the frictions between Scotland and the rest of the UK remain as calibrated with the
data40. The loss for the rest of the UK is 1.0% (about the same size as the loss for the whole of the
UK that we saw before in Table 8, which makes sense given the small size of Scotland relative to
the UK), while the loss for Scotland is slightly smaller, 0.8%, due to it being less open to foreign
trade than the rest of the UK.
The second row of Table 10 is to (i) increase the frictions between the rest of the UK and the
40To do this we assume that Scottish external trade is split between the EU and the rest of the world in the same
proportion as that of the UK as a whole. We only have export data split by destination for Scotland and in this
data Scotland exports 43% of total international exports to the rest of the EU. This is very similar to the UK figure
of 42%. In the exercises we do, it is both exports and imports that matter, and we have no data on the source of
Scottish imports. Therefore we split Scottish external trade into rEU and RoW using the split that we see in the
UK figures.
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δSct−rUK δrUK−rEU δSct−rEU Scotland rUK
(0) Data 2.067 2.677 3.952 - -
(1) Brexit, no independence 2.067 2.882 4.254 -0.8% -1.0%
(2) Brexit, independence in EU 2.707 2.882 3.952 -8.4% -1.7%
(3) Brexit, independence in EU 2.914 2.882 3.952 -9.6% -1.8%
(4) Brexit, independence out of the EU 2.914 2.882 4.254 -10.5% -1.8%
Table 10: Implied Welfare Changes for Scotland and the rest of the UK of (1) Brexit without
Scottish independence, (2) Brexit & independence (Irish friction) while Scotland remains in the
EU, (3) Brexit & independence (augmented Irish friction) while Scotland remains in the EU, and
(4) Brexit & independence with Scotland out of the EU
EU in the same manner as before, (ii) to make the frictions between Scotland and the rest of the
UK equal to the ones the UK has with Ireland like in section 4, and (iii) while leaving the frictions
between Scotland and the EU intact. Thus, this scenario accounts for Scottish independence from
the UK, and accession as an independent member state of the EU. This leads to a much larger loss
in GDP for Scotland, of 8.4%41 and a larger loss in GDP for rUK of 1.7% - which has suffered the
double effect of Brexit (cost of around 1.0%) and increased trade frictions with Scotland (implied
cost of around 0.7% of GDP).
Notice however that in this second row we have increased the frictions between Scotland and
the rest of the UK “only” to the level that Ireland has with the UK now, while the UK is a member
of the EU. Were we to increase this friction further (by the additional “marginal” effect of the EU)
then we see in the third row that losses are now even larger.
Finally, and for completeness, in the 4th row we show the impact of Scottish independence and
Brexit if Scotland does not remain within the EU. Clearly in this case the losses are again larger.
The loses for Scotland associated with Brexit are almost an order of magnitude smaller than
the loses associated with severing the within-country levels of integration that Scotland has with
the rest of the UK. The moral of this exercise is that even controlling for endogeneity effects in
41Notice again that this is a smaller loss than the 8.5% loss from the Scottish independence scenario considered
in Table 3. This is because “after” suffering an 8.5% GDP loss on independence, Scotland then benefits marginally
from trade diversion effects as rUK leaves the EU.
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the formation of countries, country borders have very large implications for trade frictions, even
within the European Union. Their effects are much larger than the, still significant, effects of the
European Union. A corrollary of this is that there are large gains from trade still available in
making the EU look like an integrated country in trade terms, though the political direction of
travel seems to be very much against this at the moment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented evidence, consistent with the economic literature on the border
effect, that regional borders are less frictional to trade than international borders (Table 1), even
within the EU. Our econometric exercise can be used to construct policy experiments that provide
an estimate of the welfare costs of changing regional borders to international borders (via political
independence) or leaving the EU (i.e., Brexit) in standard gravity models of trade (Table 3).
However, we believe that this “average” border effect overestimates the impact of sharing a
state: it is reasonable to expect that affinities that promote trade also promote selection into
sharing a state. This means that it is likely that entities with otherwise low frictions “choose”
to share a state and enjoy the integration benefit, whereas entities with high frictions “choose”
to be independent countries. The average difference between borders within and across countries
therefore overstates this integration benefit because of this selection bias. The same mechanism is
likely to exist for selection into (or out of) organizations like the EU.
We propose a methodology to deal with this selection bias: identify “marginal regions” as those
regions in our data with credible independence movements; and “marginal countries” with respect
to country R as those countries with the lowest measured frictions with R; then the difference in
frictions between a marginal region of country R and the marginal country with respect to country
R, is a better estimate of the true economic integration benefit due to political integration than the
average difference between regional and country borders. This is akin to performing a regression
discontinuity analysis. By controlling for this selection bias, we reduce the estimated integration
benefit in the case of Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country. Nevertheless, the estimates
that we obtain are still very large indeed. Likewise by the same logic we estimate a cost of Brexit
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lower than that obtained by imputing the average difference in frictions between EU and non EU
countries.
The first measurement of the border effect by McCallum (1995) showed it to be extremely large.
By incorporating economic theory to the analysis, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) reduced the
measured effect. By controlling for selection bias we further reduce its importance, but a central
claim of our paper is that it is still quantitatively significant. Our estimates are insensitive to
parameters (trade elasticity) and insensitive to model specification (e.g. inclusion of intermediate
goods) across a broad class of models from modern trade theory, and they tell the same story across
the three examples that are in our data set: the gains from economic integration that come with
political integration are worth between a third and a half of the total gains from trade, relative
to autarky, enjoyed by these regions (Table 4). This large proportion of total gains from trade
is a consequence of the extraordinary degree of integration that a region has with the rest of its
country. Despite the EU being a trade promoting body, with quantitatively significant benefits,
we do not observe the same degree of integration between countries, even within the European
Union.
The differential trade promoting effects of sharing a country have consequences that are almost
an order of magnitude larger than consequences of the differential effects of mutual EU membership.
These consequences translate into large potential gains in welfare. These are the gains from
economic integration that institutions like the European Union should strive to obtain.
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Appendices
A Data
A.1 Country Data
• WIOT2014 Nov16 ROW.xlsb downloaded from http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots16 - World
Input-Output Tables, 2016 Release, WIOT 2014 link.
• This gives GDP, Gross Output and total (goods and services) bilateral trade flows for 2014, for 43
countries plus a rest of the world aggregate.
• Data on distance and common language etc, geo cepii.xls and dist cepii.xls, downloaded from
GeoDist http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6
A.2 US Data
• US State GDP for 2014, from Bureau of Economic Analysis https://www.bea.gov/itable/iTable.
cfm?ReqID=70&step=1#reqid=70&step=10&isuri=1&7003=200&7035=-1&7004=naics&7005=1&7006=
xx&7036=-1&7001=1200&7002=1&7090=70&7007=2014&7093=levels
• State Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
US total GrossOutput× StateGDP/∑StateGDPs
• 2014 trade flows (goods only) between states and internationally from the Freight Analysis Frame-
work http://faf.ornl.gov/fafweb/Extraction1.aspx
• State International Trade used in constructing the dataset is
US International Trade× State International Trade/∑States International Trade
• State Internal Trade used in constructing the dataset is
US International Trade× State Internal Trade/∑States International Trade
• Geographical data taken from http://bl.ocks.org/sjengle/5315515
A.3 Canadian Data
• 2013 Data obtained from Statistics Canada by downloading cansim-3860003-eng-5409715410633866536.csv
from http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=3860003&tabMode=
dataTable&p1=-1&p2=-1&srchLan=0&pattern=trade
• This gives GDPs and bilateral trade flows (either goods only, or goods and services) internally and
internationally.
• Provincial Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
Canadian total GrossOutput× ProvinceGDP/∑ProvinceGDPs
• Provincial International Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Canadian International Trade×Province International Trade/∑Provinces International Trade
• Province Internal Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Canadian International Trade× Province Internal Trade/∑Provinces International Trade
• Geographical data: “canada provinces.csv” downloaded from https://www.webtrees.net/index.
php/en/add-ons/category/5-gm-files
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A.4 Scottish Data
• Scottish and UK GDP for 2014 obtained from “GERS” publication: 00523728.xlsx downloaded
from http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00523728.xlsx
• Scottish Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
UK total GrossOutput×GERS ScottishGDP/GERS UK GDP
• Goods and services trade with rest of UK and with rest of the world from Scottish Government’s
Input-Output (IO) tables for 2014. These tables also give a measure of Scottish Gross Output.
00522788.xlsx downloaded from http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00522788.xlsx
• Scottish Trade with i (i = rUK or RoW ) used in constructing the dataset is
ScottishGrossOutput× Scottish IO Tradewith i/Scottish IOGrossOutput
• rUK trade withRoW used in constructing the dataset is UK TradewithRoW−Scottish TradewithRoW
• Scottish exports to the rest of the world, as calculated above, are split by destination using Ex-
port Statistics Scotland 2015 data for 2014 for use in Herfindahl calc: 00526194.xlsx dowloaded from
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Exports/ESSPublication/ESSExcel
• Geographical data: coordinates for Edinburgh obtained from google search.
A.5 Spanish Data
• Autonomous Community GDPs in 2006 from Eurostat (”Regional gross domestic product by NUTS
2 regions - million EUR, Code: tgs00003”)
• A.C. Gross Output used in constructing the dataset is
Spanish total GrossOutput×A.C.GDP/∑A.C.GDPs
• Goods only trade data, as at 2006, for all Spanish Autonomous Communities in terms of imports
and exports to the rest of Spain and internationally, from C-Intereg 2008: Table 6 on p28 of http://
www.c-intereg.es/El_Comercio_hnterregional_en_Espa%C3%B1a_1995-2006_29_10_08.pdf
• Provincial International Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Spanish International Trade×A.C. International Trade/∑A.C. International Trade
• A.C. Internal Trade used in constructing the dataset is
Spanish International Trade×A.C. Internal Trade/∑A.C. International Trade
• Geographical data: Regional capital coordinates for Spanish autonomous communities obtained
from individual google searches.
A.6 Catalonia
• Goods and services trade (G&S) data with rest of Spain and with rest of the world as at 2005 is
available from Comptes econo`mics simplificats de l’economia catalana 2005
• Catalan Gross Output and International trade are as calculated using the Spanish A.C. (AC) data
above
• Catalan Internal trade used here is
Catalan (AC) International Trade×Catalan (G&S) Internal Trade/Catalan (G&S) Internal Trade
• Catalan exports to the rest of the world, as calculated above, are split by destination using the split
for Spain as a whole, for use in Herfindahl calc.
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A.7 Basque Country
• Goods and services trade (G&S) data with rest of Spain and with rest of the world as at 2006 is
available from http://en.eustat.es/elementos/ele0010000/ti_Gross_Domestic_Product_of_
the_Basque_Country_by_components_Supply_and_demand_Current_prices_thousands_of_euros_
2005-2012a/tbl0010072_h.html#axzz2vHsbZzjnexpressed
• Basque Gross Output and International trade are as calculated using the Spanish A.C. (AC) data
above
• Basque Internal trade used here is
Basque (AC) International Trade×Basque (G&S) Internal Trade/Basque (G&S) Internal Trade
• Basque exports to the rest of the world, as calculated above, are split by destination using the split
for Spain as a whole, for use in Herfindahl calc.
B Negative Relationship Between Size and Measured Fric-
tions
It is obvious that trade frictions should depend positively on physical distance, and negatively on whether
the entities have a common language. But it is much less obvious why there should be a significant
dependence on the size of the entities. In this section we will show that aggregation can explain this
negative dependence. To this end, we conduct the following exercise. We assume the existence economies,
and fix their trade patterns. We then view these economies at different scales of aggregation (for small
or large “countries”) and examine how the measured HRI changes with scale.
Suppose a large number, N , of very small, identical economies. Within these very small economies,
there are no trade frictions. Each of these economies has gross output, Y , and home trade share, λ,
and every bilateral pair in this world is associated with the same trade friction, δ¯ > 1 and consequently,
trade flow X. We can then look at aggregations of these small units. Suppose the underying small
economies are indexed 1, ..., N but that we can only observe aggregations (“countries”) K = {1, ..., k}
and M = {k + 1, ..., k + m < N}. Then we want to examine the relationship between the size of these
aggregations/countries, k & m, and the measured HRI between them. We are imposing the same frictions
between any two fundamental units and no extra friction for trade across the border of the data gathering
units , K & M . Therefore, if the measured HRI reflected only true trade frictions then it should be
independent of k & m. On the other hand, if there is a relationship, does it explain the slope in Figure
2, or does this figure show some true relationship between size and HRI?
We can solve for the bilateral trade flow X between each unit, in terms of the home share λ, the true
bilateral trade friction δ¯, the gross output Y , and the trade elasticity , by manipulating Equation (2):
δ¯ =
(
X2
(Y − (N − 1)X)2
) 1
2
& λ =
Y − (N − 1)X
Y
⇒ X = λY δ¯
Now consider the case where we cannot observe these small identical units, but instead the observed
actual countries are aggregrations K = {1, ..., k} and M = {k+1, ..., k+m} of non-overlapping underlying
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“countries”. In this case:
YK = kY
YM = mY
XKK = kλY + k(k − 1)X
XMM = mλY +m(m− 1)X
XKM = kmX = XMK
If we now measure the HRI associated with this KM bilateral relationship, we obtain
ln δKM =
1

ln
(
XKM
X
1/2
KKX
1/2
MM
)
=
1

ln
(
k1/2m1/2δ¯
(1 + (k − 1)δ¯)1/2(1 + (m− 1)δ¯)1/2
)
Differentiating ln δKM by lnYK and evaluating this at k = 1 gives
∂ ln δKM
∂ lnYK
=
∂ ln δKM
∂ ln k
=
1
2
(
1− δ¯
k
1 + (k − 1)δ¯
)
< 0
i.e.
∂ ln δKM
∂ lnYK
(k = 1) =
∂ ln δKM
∂ lnYM
(m = 1) =
1− δ¯
2
< 0
Therefore, purely from aggregation effects rather than any real frictions, we would expect to observe a
negative relationship between the log of the HRI and log incomes with a slope in the range 12 < 0 (for high
values of δ¯) to 0 (for a value of δ¯ ≈ 1). This range, given the value  = −3.5 used to generate Figure 2, is
(−0.142, 0). The empirically observed slope shown in Figure 2 is −0.103. There is therefore no evidence
of any true relationship between size and HRI, with the negative slope being within the expected range.
The intuition for this negative dependence of HRI upon size is that the HRI measure is a relative
measure: it measures the friction for trade with the other party relative to trade with yourself. Larger
countries have larger internal trade frictions and so a lower relative increase in frictions with external
entities. Ramondo, Rodr´ıguez-Clare, and Sabor´ıo-Rodr´ıguez (2016) provide a model for internal frictions
which deals with this effect. Doing this requires additional data, and in a simple and parsimonious
specification like that used in this paper, we cannot separately identify the productivity of the economies
from their internal trade frictions. We can however control for this phenomenon by looking at the residual
over and above what we expect given size effects.
We expect frictions to depend positively on physical distance, and negatively on a common official
language. We have now shown42 that we also expect frictions to depend negatively upon the incomes
of the trading partners due to aggregation. We now look at the residual frictions controlling (via the
regression coefficents from Table 1) for these three factors.
C Armington Model with Intermediate Goods
Extending Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (which in turn follows from Anderson (1979)) to include
intermediate goods.
• Let h, j ∈ {1, ..., N} index countries in the multilateral trade database
• Let ihj + chj ≡ the real quantity of goods used in j that were produced in h. These goods as far as
j is concerned have a unit cost of phδhj . The real quantity of goods supplied by h to j however is
δhj (ihj + chj) at unit cost ph. The expenditure from j on h goods is therefore phδhj (ihj + chj) no
matter where viewed from.
42Coughlin and Novy (2016) also make this point.
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• Production is Cobb-Douglas with share β on intermediate goods (CES aggregate of all produced
goods with elasticity of substitution σ), and share 1− β on the ”real endowment of inputs”, Sj , in
economy j (endowment-ish economy i.e. Sj (which is like the supply of effective labour) does not
change when implementing policy experiments). Output goods are priced at pj
i.e. Nominal Gross Output ”production function”
Xj = pjS
1−β
j
[∑
h
i
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
β = pjS1−βj Iβj
and Nominal Gross Output by destination of goods produced
Xj =
∑
h
pjδjh (ijh + cjh) ≡
∑
h
Xjh
But balanced trade also implies
Xj =
∑
h
Xhj =
∑
h
phδhj (ihj + chj)
where the c’s are disaggregated consumption goods and i’s are disaggregated intermediate goods
• Nominal GDP (Expenditure)
Yj = PjCj =
∑
h
phδhjchj
Nominal GDP (Income)
Yj = Xj −
∑
h
phδhjihj
• Utility Uj is equal to real consumption Cj which is CES aggregation (elasticity of substitution σ)
of disaggregated goods
Cj =
[∑
h
c
σ−1
σ
hj
] σ
σ−1
• Utility maximisation taking prices and income as given implies
δhjph = Pj
(
chj
Cj
)− 1
σ
where
Pj =
[∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
• Economy j spends P ′jIj on intermediate goods i.e.
P ′jIj =
∑
h
phδhjihj
Given this level of expenditure, economy j will want to maximise the quantity of the aggregate
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intermediate good that it purchases. This implies:
P ′j = Pj
δhjph = Pj
(
ihj
Ij
)− 1
σ
• The income version of GDP expression implies that the ”cost” of the endowment is GDP i.e.
Xj = Yj + PjIj
If using a unit of the endowment has a price Wj then
Yj = WjSj
Cost minimisation in the production of Xj , faced with prices Wj for the use of the endowment, and
Pj for the use of intermediates, implies
Yj = PjCj =
1− β
β
PjIj = (1− β)Xj
which means that
ihj
chj
=
Ij
Cj
=
Xj − Yj
Yj
=
β
1− β
• Nominal expenditure of economy j in economy h allows us to derive the gravity equation of the
model
Xhj = phδhj (ihj + chj) = . . .
=
(
1
1− β
)
p1−σh δ
1−σ
hj P
σ−1
j Yj
Xh =
∑
k
Xhk = p
1−σ
h
(
1
1− β
)∑
k
δ1−σhk P
σ−1
k Yk
i.e. p1−σh =
Yh∑
k δ
1−σ
hk P
σ−1
k Yk
Xhj =
1
1− β
YhYj
Ph
∑
k
(
Ph
Pk
)−σ
δ1−σhk
(
Yk
Pk
) (Ph
Pj
δhj
)1−σ
=
1
1− β
YhYj
Dh
(
Ph
Pj
δhj
)1−σ
where
Dh = Ph
∑
k
(
Ph
Pk
)−σ
δ1−σhk
(
Yk
Pk
)
• Also have, in this general case,
XhjXjh =
(
1
1− β
)2 Y 2h Y 2j
DhDj
(δhjδjh)
1−σ
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• Make parameter and data restrictions to simplify the model so that, as we show, it becomes very
easy to calibrate:
δjj = 1
δhj > 1, h 6= j
Now have
Xhh =
1
1− β
Y 2h
Dh
Dh =
1
1− β
Y 2h
Xhh
• Also impose
δhj = δjh
Then
XhjXjh =
(
1
1− β
)2 Y 2h Y 2j
DhDj
δ
2(1−σ)
hj = XhhXjjδ
2(1−σ)
hj
i.e. δhj =
(
XhjXjh
XhhXjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
Note that a corrolary of this is, since δhj is determined purely with reference to data on h, j and
their interaction (as well as σ), the aggregation of the rest of the world other than h and j makes
no difference to the calibrated value of δhj . The rest of the world can be expressed as a single
aggregate RoW entity, or disaggregated into its constituent countries, without affecting the value
of δhj .
• Allen, Arkolakis, and Takahashi (2014) show that
Xj =
∑
h
Xhj =
∑
h
Xjh
and
δhj = δjh
imply
Xhj = Xjh
i.e. bilaterally balanced trade
In Appendix D, we demonstrate that this is true for a three country version of the model
• Then
Xhj =
1
1− β
YhYj
Dh
(
Ph
Pj
δhj
)1−σ
=
1
1− β
YhYj
Dj
(
Pj
Ph
δhj
)1−σ
= Xjh
i.e. (
Ph
Pj
)1−σ
=
(
Dh
Dj
) 1
2
so that
Xhj =
1
1− β
YhYj
(DhDj)
1
2
δ1−σhj
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• In logs
lnXhj = − ln (1− β) + lnYh + lnYj − 1
2
lnDh − 1
2
lnDj + (1− σ) ln δhj
i.e. the Trade Elasticity, ε = 1− σ
• The econometric estimation of section 2 is
1
1− σ
[
lnXhj + ln (1− β)− lnYh + lnYj + 1
2
lnDh
1
2
lnDj
]
= ln δhj = α1E1 + ...+ αmEm
where El, l ∈ {1, ...,m} are m explanatory variables, including existence of a border, for bilateral
trade frictions. Note that the coefficients on the explanations for trade frictions depend upon
elasticity, σ.
D Bilaterally Balanced Trade
Theorem: In a 3 country model with symmetric trade frictions, trade is bilaterally
balanced
Proof:
• Always have
Xh =
3∑
j=1
Xhj =
3∑
j=1
Xjh
i.e. 3 equations in 6 unknowns. Suppose X12, X13, X23 are ”known”, then we have 3 equations
X12 +X13 = X21 +X31
X21 +X23 = X12 +X32
X31 +X32 = X13 +X23
in 3 unknowns, i.e.
X21 +X31 = X12 +X13
X21 −X32 = X12 −X23
X31 +X32 = X13 +X23
or  1 1 01 0 −1
0 1 1
 X21X31
X32
 =
 X12 +X13X12 −X23
X13 +X23

However, this matrix is singular so cannot be inverted to evaluate X21, X31, X32 in terms of
X12, X13, X23. This can be seen by noting that adding equations 2 and 3 together gives equa-
tion 1, so they are not linearly independent.
• Need to exploit more information...
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• Note however that this system does say that:
X21 −X12 = X13 −X31
X21 −X12 = X32 −X23
X31 −X13 = X23 −X32
i.e. if trade bilaterally balanced anywhere, then it’s bilaterally balanced everywhere.
• Normalise price index in economy 1 (this is what we do in the calibration)
P1 = 1
• Then define
δj ≡ δ1j =
(
(1− β) X1jD1
Y1Yj
) 1
1−σ Pj
P1
=
(
(1− β) X1jD1
Y1Yj
) 1
1−σ
Pj
So that
δhj =
(
(1− β) XhjDh
YhYj
) 1
1−σ Pj
Ph
= . . .
=
δj
δh
(
X1hXhj
X1jXhh
) 1
1−σ
• Impose symmetric frictions, then
δ1j =
δj
1
(
X11X1j
X1jX11
) 1
1−σ
=
1
δj
(
X1jXj1
X11Xjj
) 1
1−σ
= δj1
δj =
(
X1jXj1
X11Xjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
so
δhj =
(
X1hXj1
Xh1X1j
X2hj
XhhXjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
δjh =
(
X1jXh1
Xj1X1h
X2jh
XjjXhh
) 1
2(1−σ)
and
δhj =
(
X1hXj1
Xh1X1j
X2hj
XhhXjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
=
(
X1jXh1
Xj1X1h
X2jh
XjjXhh
) 1
2(1−σ)
= δjh
i.e.
Xjh
Xhj
=
X1hXj1
Xh1X1j
• This means that e.g.
X32
X23
=
X12X31
X21X13
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• Therefore
X21 +X31 = X12 +X13 = A
X21 −X32 = X12 −X23 = B
X32X21
X31
=
X12X23
X13
= C
i.e.
X32 = C
X31
X21
X31 =
1
C
X21 (X21 −B)
1
C
X221 +
(
1− B
C
)
X21 −A = 0
and eventually
X21 =
− (1− BC )+√(1− BC )2 + 4 1CA
2 1C
=
1
2
(
B − C +
√
C2 +B2 − 2BC + 4AC
)
=
1
2
(
X12 −X23 −
(
X12X23
X13
))
+
1
2
×√(
X12X23
X13
)2
+ (X12 −X23)2 − 2 (X12 −X23)
(
X12X23
X13
)
+ 4 (X12 +X13)
(
X12X23
X13
)
=
1
2
(
X12 −X23 −
(
X12X23
X13
))
+
1
2
1
X13
√
X212X
2
13 + 2X12X
2
13X23 + 2X
2
12X13X23 +X
2
13X
2
23 + 2X12X13X
2
23 +X
2
12X
2
23
=
1
2
(
X12 −X23 −
(
X12X23
X13
)
+
1
X13
√
(X12X13 +X13X23 +X12X23)
2
)
= X12
as req.
• Since we have X21 = X12, we have already shown that trade is bilaterally balanced everywhere i.e.
X31 = X13 and X32 = X23.
E Calibration
• Price index in country 1, P1, is assumed to be normalised to 1.
• Have
Dh =
Y 2h
(1− β)Xhh
• And
δhj =
(
XhjXjh
XhhXjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
=
(
X2hj
XhhXjj
) 1
2(1−σ)
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and
P 1−σj = P
1−σ
k
(
Dj
Dk
) 1
2
=
∑
h
(δhjph)
1−σ
Since data, {Yh, Xhj}, gives Dh & hence δhj , and given the normalisation P1 = 1, this is a system
of N linear equations in N unknowns,
{
p1−σ1 , p
1−σ
2 , ..., p
1−σ
N
}
P 1−σ1
(
Dj
D1
) 1
2
=
(
Dj
D1
) 1
2
=
∑
h
(δh1ph)
1−σ
• Example with 3 countries:
– data & parameters
Y1, Y2, Y3
X12 = X21, X13 = X31, X23 = X32
X11 =
Y1
1− β −X12 −X13
X22 =
Y2
1− β −X12 −X23
X33 =
Y3
1− β −X13 −X23
σ, δ11 = δ22 = δ33 = 1
– Equations:
D1 =
Y 21
(1− β)X11
D2 =
Y 22
(1− β)X22
D3 =
Y 23
(1− β)X33
δ12 =
(
X212
X11X22
) 1
2(1−σ)
δ13 =
(
X213
X11X33
) 1
2(1−σ)
δ23 =
(
X223
X22X33
) 1
2(1−σ)
P1 = 1 (normalisation)
11
1 = (δ11p1)
1−σ + (δ21p2)1−σ + (δ31p3)1−σ(
D2
D1
) 1
2
= (δ12p1)
1−σ + (δ22p2)1−σ + (δ32p3)1−σ(
D3
D1
) 1
2
= (δ13p1)
1−σ + (δ23p2)1−σ + (δ33p3)1−σ
 p1−σ1p1−σ2
p1−σ3
 =
 1 δ1−σ12 δ1−σ13δ1−σ12 1 δ1−σ23
δ1−σ13 δ
1−σ
23 1
−1

1(
D2
D1
) 1
2(
D3
D1
) 1
2

P 1−σ2 = P
1−σ
1
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
=
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
P 1−σ3 = P
1−σ
1
(
D3
D1
) 1
2
=
(
D3
D1
) 1
2
F Policy experiment
• data and parameters
σ
S1, S2, S3 (exogenous supply)
δ11 = δ22 = δ33 = 1
δ12 = δ21, δ13 = δ31, δ23 = δ32 (pol exp)
P1 = 1 (normalisation)
• 8 Unknowns
{p1,p2, p3, P2, P3, D1, D2, D3}
• 8 Equations  p1−σ1p1−σ2
p1−σ3
 =
 1 δ1−σ12 δ1−σ13δ1−σ12 1 δ1−σ23
δ1−σ13 δ
1−σ
23 1
−1

1(
D2
D1
) 1
2(
D3
D1
) 1
2

P 1−σ2 =
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
P 1−σ3 =
(
D3
D1
) 1
2
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where D’s must satisfy:
D1 = P1
[
Y1
P1
+
(
P1
P2
)−σ
δ1−σ12
Y2
P2
+
(
P1
P3
)−σ
δ1−σ13
Y3
P3
]
D2 = P2
[(
P2
P1
)−σ
δ1−σ21
Y1
P1
+
Y2
P2
+
(
P2
P3
)−σ
δ1−σ23
Y3
P3
]
D3 = P3
[(
P3
P1
)−σ
δ1−σ31
Y1
P1
+
(
P3
P2
)−σ
δ1−σ32
Y2
P2
+
Y3
P3
]
with
Yj = Sj (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
Wj = (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
• Welfare impact: (
Y ′h/P
′
h
Yh/Ph
)
− 1
where dashed quantities are in policy experiment and undashed quantities are in the calibration.
• Counterfactual trade flows given by
Xjj =
Y 2j
(1− β)Dj
Xhj =
1
1− βYhYjD
− 1
2
h D
− 1
2
j δ
1−σ
hj
G Welfare formula
• Data
– Home share, λ
λ =
X11
X1
=
X1 −X12
X1
– Normalise GDP i.e.
Y1 = 1 = (1− β)X1
– i.e.
X1 =
1
1− β
X11 =
λ
1− β
X12 =
1− λ
1− β
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• Have, from gravity equations
X11 =
1
1− βY1Y1D
−1
1
i.e. D1 =
1
1− β
1
X11
=
1
λ
X12 =
1
1− βY1Y2D
− 1
2
1 D
− 1
2
2 δ
1−σ
=
λ
1
2
1− β
Y2
D
1
2
2
δ1−σ =
1− λ
1− β
X22 =
1
1− βY2Y2D
−1
2
i.e.
Y2
D
1
2
2
= X
1
2
22 (1− β)
1
2
so
δ =
 1− λ
λ
1
2X
1
2
22 (1− β)
1
2
 11−σ
which is the same as
δ =
(
X212
X11X22
) 1
2(1−σ)
i.e. X22 =
X212
X11
δ−2(1−σ)
=
(1− λ)2
λ (1− β) δ2(1−σ)
also have
D2 =
Y 22
X22 (1− β)
• Adding up in 2nd economy
Y2
1− β = X2 = X22 +X12
D2 =
Y 22
X22 (1− β) = (1− β)
(X22 +X12)
2
X22
= (1− β) (X22 +X12)
2
X22
= (1− β)
(
(1−λ)2
λ(1−β)δ2(1−σ) +
1−λ
1−β
)2
(1−λ)2
λ(1−β)δ2(1−σ)
=
(
1− λ+ λδ2(1−σ))2
λδ2(1−σ)
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• Then 5 Equations
1 = p1−σ1 + δ
1−σp1−σ2(
D2
D1
) 1
2
= δ1−σp1−σ1 + p
1−σ
2 1(
D2
D1
) 1
2
 = [ 1 δ1−σ
δ1−σ 1
] [
p1−σ1
p1−σ2
]
[
p1−σ1
p1−σ2
]
=
[
1 δ1−σ
δ1−σ 1
]−1  1(
D2
D1
) 1
2

P 1−σ2 =
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
where D’s must satisfy:
D1 = P1
[
Y1
P1
+
(
P1
P2
)−σ
δ1−σ
Y2
P2
]
D2 = P2
[(
P2
P1
)−σ
δ1−σ
Y1
P1
+
Y2
P2
]
with
Yj = Sj (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
Wj = (1− β)
(
β
Pj
p
1
β
j
) β
1−β
• i.e. [
p1−σ1
p1−σ2
]
=
[
1 δ1−σ
δ1−σ 1
]−1  1(
D2
D1
) 1
2

=
1
1− δ2(1−σ)
[
1 −δ1−σ
−δ1−σ 1
] 1(
D2
D1
) 1
2

p1−σ1 =
1
1− δ2(1−σ)
(
1− δ1−σ
(
D2
D1
) 1
2
)
= λ
so
p1 = λ
1
1−σ
then
1
1− ββ
− β
1−β λ
− 1
1−σ
1
1−β = S1
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Figure 9: Scottish real income as a function of the trade friction with the rest of the UK.
Imposing measured Scot-rUK frictions implies no change in Scottish income relative to the data.
Note that infinite frictions with the rest of the UK is not an autarkic Scotland, frictions with the
rest of the world are as measured in the data.
• Policy experiment is δ →∞
• In this case p1 = 1 so
Y ′1 = S1 (1− β) (β)
β
1−β
= λ
− 1
1−σ
1
1−β
• i.e. welfare change is (
Y ′
Y
)
− 1 = λ− 11−σ 11−β − 1
=
(
1
λ
) 1
(1−β)(1−σ)
− 1
H The incentive to integrate
In this appendix we note that income is a convex function of bilateral frictions. Figure 9 shows the level
of GDP implied by the model for Scotland as a function of log frictions with the rest of the UK, relative to
the GDP that it has with current frictions. An intuition behind this convex shape is that it must clearly
asymptote to a horizontal line as frictions get very large and you approach zero bilateral trade: the change
from nearly infinite frictions to very large but not so large frictions will not change trade patterns much
once you are not trading at all. Conversely, the change from medium to small frictions may have a large
impact on trade patterns and hence income.
When two entities are closely integrated (due to high affinities, say) the marginal benefit of further
integration (via political union, say) is larger than it is for entities which are not so closely integrated
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(with lower affinities). This supports a selection mechanism whereby pairs with otherwise lower frictions
have a greater incentive to form a unified country than those pairs with higher frictions. Trade models, in
the general class of gravity models, imply greater integration benefits from marginal reductions in frictions
for entities that already have low frictions.
As an example, in Figure 9 we plot the log frictions that Ireland has with the UK, that Portugal has
with Spain, and the impact that imposing these frictions has on Scottish income. Suppose that political
integration is associated with a reduction in log frictions of size I = 0.1. Then, as can be seen, the income
gain, +2.4%, is higher if we start at the less frictional Ireland-UK position, than if we start at the more
frictional Portugal-Spain position, in which case it is +1.6%.
This lends additional support to the proposition that there will be selection into state sharing and
that econometric estimates of the average difference between regional and international borders is not
appropriate for determining the value of the economic integration generated by political integration.
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